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BANKING CRISES; DETERMINANTS AND CRISES‘ IMPACT ON FISCAL COST AND 
ECONOMIC OUTPUT 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This thesis‘ first empirical part studies determinants associated with the emergence of 
systemic banking crises. Low GDP growth, high inflation, low creditor rights, low GDP 
per capita and financial reforms are hypothesized to increase the probability of a banking 
crisis. I evaluate the determinants‘ value in explaining 80 banking crisis around the globe  
by employing a multivariate logit model, exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997). This thesis‘ second empirical part evaluates banking crises‘ effects on fiscal cost 
and economic output by regressing each of these two dependent variables separately on a 
number of new or updated explanatory variables in an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). This study provides new 
insights into the determinants and effects of banking crises with new and larger datasets 
and time frames as well as better and further developed variables. 
DATA 
From the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008) I obtain the core data on banking crises, 
consisting of 80 banking crises in a sample of 120 countries during the period of 1980 to 
2005. From IMF‘s IFS database and world economic outlook (WEO) I obtain the data for 
the remaining variables. The data finally consists of 2755 country-year observations for the 
empirical part I on the determinants of banking crises. For the empirical part II on banking 
crises‘ effects, I obtain the complete data on 42 banking crises and their explanatory 
variables, during the period of 1970 to 2007, from the database by Laeven and Valencia 
(2008). 
RESULTS 
The findings of the study on determinants of banking crises show that low GDP growth, 
highly developed institutional and regulatory environments and high GDP per capita 
increase the probability of a banking crisis statistically significantly. This thesis updated 
the study of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and turned their results around. The 
findings of the second empirical part on banking crises effects show that a parallel 
currency crisis and explicit deposit insurances increase the economic output loss. French 
and Socialist law countries experience lower output losses but more frequent crises. As in 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), I also observe that government interventions result in 
higher fiscal costs. Additionally, higher fiscal expenditure was not found to reduce output 
losses, exactly as Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003) conclude. However, foregone 
tax revenues due to output losses might also impact fiscal cost, as suggested by Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008). Thus, any conclusion about the relationship between fiscal cost and 
output loss is difficult due to a possible endogeneity. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The origins and effects of banking crises are currently, in the light of the U.S. credit and 
banking crises that started in 2007, often discussed. The public and media search for 
explanations but even more for scapegoats. However, during these discussions very 
fundamental aspects seem to be forgotten. The public‘s surprise about the possibility of a 
banking crisis shows that most have not understood the current financial system and its 
history. Therefore, I argue that understanding banking crises requires first to understand 
financial systems, banking and the history of financial crises. 
Levine (1997) argues that banks satisfy random liquidity needs of lenders better (at lower 
risks) than if these lenders would invest their funds directly in the financial markets. 
However, in order to credibly commit to repay depositors, banks must choose a fragile bank 
capital structure; argue Diamond and Rajan (2001). Thus, the risk of a banking crisis may be a 
necessary disciplinary device in an imperfect market.  
Liquidity is only provided if expected returns during times of low market liquidity are high in 
order to compensate providers for their large opportunity cost of holding idle capital for a 
long time. Low market liquidity however can trigger cash-in-the-market pricing which may 
lead to fire-sales, contagion and self-fulfilling prophecies of a banking crisis (Kane, 1989; 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  
Research (e.g. Lindgren et al., 1996; Dooley and Frankel, 2003; and Collyns and Kincaid, 
2003) identified various underlying macroeconomic origins of past banking crises such as 
inflation, cyclical output downturns, term of trade deterioration, exchange rate crashes, and 
currency as well as asset and real estate devaluations. Additionally, financial liberalization 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998), flexible exchange rate regimes (Peria, 2003), public 
bank ownership (Caprio and Levine, 2001), a weak institutional environment (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1998) and an explicit deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2002) were all found to increase the probability of a banking crisis.  
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Once a banking crisis is ongoing, the credit crunch hypothesis predicts that decreased bank 
credits to firms decrease investments and expenditure, thus resulting in decreased economic 
output and demand (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache., 2005). While fighting a banking crisis, governments face a trade-off 
between fiscal and economical costs. Higher fiscal spending on government interventions is 
expected to decrease the economical cost of crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). However, 
earlier findings suggest that generous support to the banking system does not reduce the 
output cost of banking crises (Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2003).  
Therefore, an important question to policy makers and economists is how to decrease the 
negative effects of a banking crisis most efficiently and effectively as well as how to prevent a 
banking crisis totally. Also highlighted should be the fact that ―econometric analyses of 
systemic banking crises are a new field‖ (Demirgüc-Kunt, Detragiache, 2005) and only 
limited research exists. Hence, more empirical research about banking crises, their origins and 
relation to economic and fiscal cost is needed.  
I contribute to the research on banking crises by providing new insights into the determinants 
and effects of banking crises with new and larger datasets and time frames as well as better 
and further developed variables. Specifically, the dataset by Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
gives the opportunity to research banking crises‘ effects by taking into account government 
interventions. To my knowledge, earlier studies did not address broad government 
interventions and policies sufficiently, while researching banking crises‘ effects. Additionally, 
by taking a larger time frame, I will turn earlier results of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) about determinants of banking crises around. Therefore, this thesis adds in-depth 
insight and new results to the research of banking crises‘ determinants and effects. 
1.2 Empirical part I: Determinants of banking crises 
The first empirical part studies the factors associated with the emergence of systemic banking 
crises. I hypothesize GDP growth, real interest rate, inflation, M2 to reserves, creditor rights, 
GDP per capita and financial reforms to have an impact on the probability of a banking crisis.  
I evaluate the chosen determinants‘ value in explaining 80 banking crisis around the globe by 
employing a multivariate logit model, exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). 
From the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008) I obtain the core data on banking crises, 
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consisting of 80 banking crises within a sample of 120 countries during the period of 1980 to 
2005. From IMF‘s IFS database and world economic outlook (WEO) I obtain the data for the 
remaining variables. The data finally consists of 2755 country-year observations. 
Following variables are hypothesized to influence the possibility of a banking crisis. Low 
GDP growth is hypothesized to reflect adverse macroeconomic shocks that hurt banks 
through higher rates of non-performing loans (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). High 
short-term real interest rates affect banks negatively if they are not able to quickly pass the 
higher interests on to their customers (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). Real interest 
rates might proxy financial liberalization (Galbis, 1993) which is then again found to increase 
the likelihood of a banking crisis (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). The variable 
measuring inflation is expected to reflect macroeconomic mismanagement as high inflation is 
hypothesized to be a sign for a price bubble (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). The ratio of M2 to 
foreign exchange reserves of the central bank measures sudden capital in- or outflows and a 
country‘s vulnerability to balance-of-payment problems (Calvo, 1996). Thus, a high ratio of 
M2 to foreign exchange reserves is hypothesized to increase the probability of a banking 
crisis. The variable measuring creditor rights in each country is hypothesized to reflect the 
economy wide impact of a strong legal system and thus lower likelihood of a banking crisis 
(LLSV, 1999; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). The dummy measuring the 
introduction of a financial reform equals 1 for five years if the country was undergoing a large 
financial reform and thus has a larger risk of a banking crisis (Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998). Finally, I also measure the time that passed by since the last crisis as I 
expect that the probability of a crisis increases over time as new problems after the last crisis 
accumulate anew (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997).  
As a summary of the results, low GDP growth, highly developed institutional and regulatory 
environments and high GDP per capita were shown to increase the probability of a banking 
crisis statistically significantly. Therefore, this study updated the study of Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997) and turned their results around. Their study‘s time frame is from 1980 to 
1994 for which they find countries with weak institutional environments, low GDP per capita 
and low GDP growth to inhibit the largest risks of banking crises. The fact that the study by 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) has a different time frame is a limitation to 
comparing results. However, at the same time this is also an update of the results for most 
variables that are defined exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). Thus, by 
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taking a larger time frame, this study turned earlier results of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) around. In addition, according to my knowledge, no previous study has employed such 
a large time frame while studying determinants of banking crises. Therefore, this thesis adds 
in-depth insight and new results to the research of banking crises‘ determinants. Especially, 
we showed that most variables are statistically significantly correlated to at least one other 
variable. This raised questions about the endogeneity of these variables and whether the true 
determinants of banking crises are yet found. Future research is advised to focus on 
developing better determinants of banking crises.  
1.3 Empirical part II: Banking crises’ effects 
The second empirical part evaluates banking crises‘ effect on fiscal cost and economic output 
by regressing each of the two dependent variables separately on a number of explanatory 
variables in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. This event study methodology is 
performed exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). I argue that financial and 
structural variables as well as government interventions explain fiscal costs and economic 
output loss of banking crises. From the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008) I obtain the 
complete data on 42 banking crises and their explanatory variables during the period of 1970 
to 2007.  
In summary, I report a parallel currency crisis and an explicit deposit insurance to increase the 
economic output loss. Countries with French and Socialist law origins experience lower 
output losses but more frequent crises. As in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), I observe that 
government interventions result in higher fiscal costs. Also, higher fiscal expenditure was not 
found to reduce output losses, exactly as in Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003). 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) suggest that a possible explanation could be found in output 
losses which result in foregone tax revenues and ultimately in higher fiscal costs. Thus, any 
conclusion about the relationship between fiscal cost and output losses is difficult due to a 
possible endogeneity. Finally, near-by elections are shown to decrease fiscal costs statistically 
significantly. 
This study has limitations as financial crises are rare in number, thus this empirical part II is 
based on relatively few data points. In addition, every crisis might be different from previous 
ones, thus coefficients derived from in-sample estimation are of limited use out-of-sample 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Also, information on intervention policies is rare 
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and each intervention might depend on the skills of the policy makers. On the other hand, 
according to my knowledge, no previous research has used such a rich set of variables 
(including government intervention variables) while researching banking crises‘ effects.  
1.4 Case study 
Banking crises‘ determinants of my empirical study I would not have accurately detected the 
U.S. credit and banking crisis that started in 2007. Exactly as Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), I 
suggest therefore that every banking crisis might be different. Thus, I investigate the U.S. 
banking crisis that started in 2007, its development and origins, in a case study. I identify 
securitization, the institutional environment, account imbalances and hubris as major origins 
of this crisis. This case study adds to the literature a valuable and comprehensive review of 
the current literature on the U.S. credit and banking crisis‘ most important reasons and 
origins.  
1.5 Structure of the study 
The remaining of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
financial systems, banking, liquidity and banking crises. Thereafter, Section 3 inhibits two 
empirical studies of banking crises‘ determinants and costs. Section 4 looks at the U.S. 
banking crises of 2007 and Section 5 concludes this study with a summary of the findings.  
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2 Literature review 
Understanding banking crises requires understanding the theory of financial systems and 
banking in general. Thus I first review the theory of financial systems. The most important act 
of financial intermediation is the creation of liquidity. Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that 
banks need a fragile bank capital structure to be able to credibly commit to pay back funds to 
depositors. Consequently, the risk of a banking crisis may be a necessary disciplinary device 
in an imperfect market. Such a risk materializes, thus a banking crises arises, due to various 
macroeconomic origins of banking crises such as inflation, cyclical output downturns, terms 
of trade deterioration, exchange rate crashes, and currency as well as asset and real estate 
devaluations (e.g. Lindgren et al., 1996; Dooley and Frankel, 2003; and Collyns and Kincaid, 
2003). Once a banking crisis is ongoing, the credit crunch hypothesis predicts that decreased 
bank credits to firms decrease investments and expenditure, which results in decreased 
economic output and demand (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005). Governments‘ intervention in the banking crisis will on the other hand 
result in fiscal costs. Therefore, governments face a trade-off between fiscal and economical 
cost as higher fiscal spending on government interventions is expected to decrease the 
economical cost of crises, and vice-versa (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).  
After this literature review introduction each literature part is reviewed separately. After the 
theory of financial systems, banking and liquidity follows the history and determinants of 
banking crises as well as the crises‘ fiscal and economical costs. 
2.1 Financial systems and intermediation 
Already Adam Smith (1776) viewed the high density of banks in Scotland at that time as a 
reason for the high development of the Scottish economy. One and a half centuries later, 
Schumpeter (1911) argued that banks creating credit is an essential source of entrepreneurs‘ 
capability to drive real growth (through employing a new mix of factor use). Goldsmith 
(1969) is one of the first researchers analyzing financial wealth and GDP in an empirical 
study. After Goldsmith (1969), a vast amount of empirical research followed which mainly 
reported a positive relationship between the size and liquidity of bank and capital markets 
(e.g. King and Levine, 1993a, b; and Levine and Zervos, 1998). Positive relation between the 
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bank and capital sector development and real economic growth is found by Levine, Loayza 
and Beck (2000), Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999), Neusser and Kugler (1998), and Rousseau 
and Wachtel (1998). Also, Rajan and Zingales (1998) found that industries relying more 
heavily on external financing grow faster under well developed financial system conditions.  
Financial systems satisfy demands that can be categorized according to Levine (1997) into 
facilitating trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling of risks; allocating resources; 
monitoring managers and exerting corporate control; mobilizing savings; and facilitating the 
exchange of goods and services. Merton and Bodie (1995) summarize financial systems‘ 
primary function perfectly as ―facilitating the allocation of resources, across space and time, 
in an uncertain environment‖. 
The difference between bank- and capital-focused financial systems was researched by 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1999). They report that bank-focused systems mobilize savings, 
allocate capital, oversee investment decisions and provide risk management. On the other 
hand, capital markets mainly exert corporate control (exert corporate governance), provide 
long term financing and ease risk management. Therefore, financial markets alleviate market 
frictions which come as information cost, cost of reinforcing contracts and cost of exchanging 
goods and financial claims (Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 1999). 
In addition, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1999) find that, as income rises, capital and bank 
sectors‘ efficiency and developments soar. On the other hand, French civil law tradition 
countries with poor accounting standards, heavy banking restriction and high inflation tend to 
have underdeveloped financial systems (Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Nevertheless, despite positive developments in external finance, the dominant source of 
financing is still corporate cash flow (Thiel, 2001). Corporate cash flows often account for 
over 50% of total financing (Graff, 2000). On the other hand, as Adam Smith (1776) already 
argued, banking is beneficial for an economy. 
2.2 Unstable banking 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem lets Fama (1980) conclude that lenders can construct optimal 
portfolios themselves and therefore have no need for intermediaries. However, in practice 
these theoretical approaches are unrealistic since large portfolios would be needed to be hold 
and skills and expertise to be acquired (Allen and Santomero, 1996). Therefore banks have for 
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a long time played an important role in the transformation of savings into investments in real 
assets as they face higher economies of scale in evaluating assets, lower trading costs, more 
diversification and lower information asymmetry.
1
 
A traditional view on the theory of banking is offered by Diamond and Rajan (2001) who 
specify that both, investors and borrowers, are concerned about liquidity. Investors need 
liquidity because they are uncertain about when they desire to eliminate their holding of the 
financial asset whereas borrowers focus on liquidity due to uncertainty of future cash inflows 
or amounts of future retainable funds. To balance these different liquidity concerns, a bank is 
optimal to be at the centre. The bank creates liquidity for depositors by insuring them to get 
better access to their funds at a similar expected return than if invested directly (satisfy 
random liquidity needs of the lender better at lower risk). At the same time, borrowers are 
insured against the liquidity risk that funding will be cut off prematurely because not all 
future cash flows can be credibly pledged to outside investors (Hart, 1995). 
A bank can optimally develop specific talents that allow it to lend against illiquid assets but 
nevertheless avoid the costs of illiquidity since it raises cash through other means. Cash can 
come from other sources such as loan repayments, liquidity maintenance and most important 
by attracting new deposits which combined offset withdrawals. This allows the bank 
continuity and no need to transfer illiquid assets. Also, banks have specific skills to maximize 
loan values which results in a relationship specific rent (e.g. bankers‘ higher salaries and 
perks) and thus might reduce bank‘s ability to borrow against loan repayments. Diamond and 
Rajan (2001) argue that banks can commit to pay depositors everything collected from 
borrowers (minus the specified operating costs and bankers‘ compensation) by choosing a 
fragile capital structure. Under such a capital structure, a financial crisis is triggered if the 
bank attempts to get concessions from depositors or when depositors lose confidence that the 
bank will not deliver all repayments. This would in a theoretical model, in which neither 
transaction nor information costs exist, mean that banks have to renegotiate loans with 
borrowers and a disintermediation effect takes place. Depositors share in the bank‘s exclusive 
right of negotiating loans and try to seize the loans from borrowers which will weaken the 
borrower‘s incentives to fully pay back loans. Additionally, a bank run would partially 
transfer banks‘ revenues to lenders and borrowers. This is the largest incentive and discipline 
                                                 
1 The bank was described as a ―delegated monitor‖ by Diamond (1984). 
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for banks to avoid bank runs. Additionally, bank runs can also occur under self-fulfilling fears 
that the bank will not stick by the deal (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
Despite the high usage of such traditional theories on banking it is to acknowledge that, since 
the 1970s and 1980s, financial innovation has been extensive. Especially the rise of 
securitization considerably changed the banking landscape as loan origination became 
separated from holding the loan (and its risk). Shleifer and Vishny (2009) proposed therefore 
a new theoretical model of banking called ―unstable banking‖.  
In this financial intermediary theory by Shleifer and Vishny (2009), markets are influenced by 
investor sentiment and banks make loans, securitize these loans, trade in them or hold cash. 
They can also borrow money by using these securities as collateral. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2009) see banks as maximizing their profit and avoiding any conflict between its bank 
shareholders and creditors. Also, if banks can‘t securitize loans, they smooth their lending 
over time whereas when securitizing, they respond to investor sentiment. The bank‘s small 
equity share is used to co-invest in newly-securitized loans in times of high asset prices and 
buy or hold securities in times of low asset prices. Profit in good times is so high that banks 
borrow short-term and consequently take the risk (assign low probability to a downturn) of 
having to liquidate holdings at fire sales prices in bad times. This rational irrationality 
destabilizes security prices. Thus, banks leave out profit opportunities to buy distressed assets 
or finance investments in bad times. This makes the financial intermediaries prone to 
cyclicality in terms of profits, balance sheet and real investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 2009). 
Thus, securitization made banking more unstable and cyclical but also increased levels of 
investments although possibly only during times of bubbles (resulting in reduced efficiency). 
Unstable banking therefore leads security market fluctuations into the real economy instead of 
smoothing out economical cycles.
2
  
In summary, the described model of Shleifer and Vishny (2009) accounts for cyclical 
behaviour of credit and investment and fundamental instability of banks in financial markets
3
. 
Most importantly, I noted that banks might need to face the risk of financial distress and 
bankruptcy in order to function optimally. Thus, incomplete markets may require financial 
fragility and liquidity risks. 
                                                 
2
 Volatility of investor sentiment impacts the volatility of the real activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2009). 
3
 Especially when banks use leverage, there is a fundamental instability of banks in financial markets (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2009).  
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2.3 Theory of liquidity, financial fragility and contagion 
From a financial intermediary‘s perspective, intermediaries provide liquidity insurance to 
lenders against their individual liquidity shocks (Allen and Gale, 2004, 2007). Financial 
markets in turn allow financial intermediaries to share aggregate risks (Allen and Gale, 2004, 
2007). The fact that banks manage liquidity needs of depositors leads to two uncertainties for 
banks. First, each bank faces idiosyncratic liquidity risk since consumers have varying 
liquidity needs over time. Second, aggregate liquidity risk exposes all banks to a general 
demand for a varying level of liquidity. Complete financial markets would efficiently provide 
liquidity by ensuring that banks hedge their liquidity shocks. Such a hedging would be 
ensured if each bank issued a small amount of security contingent on the idiosyncratic 
liquidity shock experienced by each other bank in the system (Allen and Carletti, 2008). 
Hence, each bank bought all the issued securities (contingent on the bank‘s own idiosyncratic 
shocks) from the other banks. Therefore, whenever a bank experiences an idiosyncratic 
liquidity shock, it is fully hedged since it obtains funds to cover the liquidity requirement. On 
the other hand, hedging aggregate liquidity risk is more challenging and time consuming. 
Only a complicating structure of hedges combined with equilibrium prices of all bank-specific 
securities besides an efficient central bank would lead to a liquid financial system. The correct 
equilibrium prices would be ensured by the ―invisible hand‖ which in turn leads to correct 
incentives for liquidity in the banking system (Allen, Carletti and Gale, 2008). 
Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008) argue that a theoretically complete market would require large 
bank-specific securities which, in practice, are largely inexistent. The infrastructure could be 
very costly and inconvenient in practice. Despite existing hedging instruments such as credit 
default swaps, markets are incomplete and banks are therefore not able to fully hedge against 
liquidity risks which leads to inefficient provisions of liquidity by the financial system (Allen 
and Carletti, 2008). Such provisions can exist in form of cash-in-the-market pricing (prices of 
safe assets can fall below their fundamental value) that lead to financial fragility where small 
shocks can have large effects on asset prices. Also, contagion effects can arise in which an 
individual bank‘s shock spreads to other institutions leading to a chain of bankruptcies. In the 
case of contagion effects, financial fragility is high and cash-in-the-market pricing might be 
observable.  
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2.3.1 Cash-in-the-market pricing and financial fragility 
I find that incomplete markets result in incomplete liquidity provisions which in turn alter the 
nature of managing liquidity risk in banks. This is opposite to the framework of Allen and 
Gale (2004, 2007) in which complete markets would ease hedging of liquidity risk and the 
price system would ensure adequate liquidity and proper prices. In that case liquidity-
securities are bought and sold where it is plentiful and rare, thus the financial system allows 
risk sharing and insurance. On the other hand, incomplete markets may require selling assets 
to obtain liquidity. These assets‘ prices are determined by the liquidity (=cash) in the market. 
Thus, a counterparty would need to hold extra liquidity to buy the asset in case of low 
liquidity. These counterparties are compensated with an average cost of providing liquidity 
across all countries where liquidity is low. Such liquidity providers face two choices, either to 
invest into productive long assets at higher return rates or to hold excess cash at low return 
rates with the expectation of earning even higher returns once invested. Assuming 
theoretically that no one were holding liquidity, long asset values would collapse to zero until 
the incentive is large enough to hold liquidity as assets would be acquired so inexpensively. 
Hence, equilibrium prices have to compensate liquidity providers for holding liquidity 
constantly which will therefore result in much higher expected returns.
4
 The higher the 
expected returns are, the lower the asset prices have to be in order to reach equilibrium. This 
yields negative insurance and suboptimal risk sharing since the timing is very inefficient for 
there to be a wealth transfer between banks demanding liquidity and suppliers of liquidity 
(Allen and Carletti, 2008). Asset price volatility is costly because bank‘s depositors are risk 
averse (only share in negative returns, but not positive returns) and deposit demand depends 
on the banks idiosyncratic risk (Allen and Carletti, 2006, 2008). In this whole framework of 
incomplete markets, the need for a central bank and its intervention is noted. Through fixing 
asset prices or short term interest rates that remove inefficiencies derived from asset price 
volatility, the central bank can achieve similar allocation as in complete markets argue Allen, 
Carletti and Gale (2008). In summary, financial fragility in form of volatile asset prices may 
be necessary in incomplete markets because incentives to provide liquidity might only then 
exist. This, however, may lead to costly crisis and the need for central bank intervention.  
                                                 
4
 Since liquidity needs can‘t be forecast these liquidity providers face large opportunity costs of holding idle 
capital. 
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2.3.2 Contagion 
Incomplete markets also inhibit risk of contagion, signifying the risk of spreading an 
individual financial institutions risk to other ones, thus potentially disrupting the whole 
financial system. More precisely, contagion risk comes from overlapping claims that financial 
institutions have on each other. Defaulting Bank A for example decreases Bank B‘s assets if 
Bank A‘s claims are included in these assets. Such a strong enough spill over effect might 
even yield a default of Bank B leading to a default of Bank C which has Bank B‘s assets in its 
accounts and might have been already weakened by Bank A‘s. This causes a systemic crisis in 
which a higher degree of interconnectedness results in a further but less strong spread of the 
crisis and a shock can be absorbed better. On the other hand, if only a few but strong links 
exist, then crisis are more likely to spread since capital buffers are overwhelmed by the 
strength of the defaulting link (one of only a few but strong links). Contagion can be very 
expensive for a financial system which in turn would potentially have large spill over effects 
to the real economy. In such a scenario, firms face low or no access to funding and 
consequently are forced to cut back investment and output levels.  
 
 
Figure I Network of interest rate swap arrangements 
Figure 1 shows that all parties (Bank A and B as well as Hedge fund B and D) are inter-connected but are missing a 
central party which could file a multilateral netting arrangement and thus eliminate all exposure. This market 
imperfection may lead to costly crises. 
 
Contagion risk and the risk of network effects are often found in the current financial 
architecture of the 21
st
 century, which is made up of an interwoven network of financial 
obligations. Often, obligations are offset with other parties which in turn then offset again 
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their obligation. As an illustration, Bank A and hedge fund (HF) B agree on an interest rate 
swap in which B offsets its position with another interest rate swap with counterparty Bank C. 
Essentially, Bank A and Bank C do now have an indirect connection too as it would be 
unwise for A to renew the contract if C were in financial difficulty (Brunnermeier, 2008). For 
further illustration lets still assume that C offsets obligations with HF D which in turn does 
the same offsetting contract with A. Now all parties from A to D are fully hedged. A 
multilateral netting arrangement could eliminate all exposure. However, each party only 
knows about two of the other three parties in this cycle, as seen in Figure 1. Therefore, any 
potential uncertainties lead to higher perceived counterparty credit risk. Thus, banks A and C 
require B and D to put up more liquidity or purchase credit default swaps which may be at 
times very costly. 
These over-the-counter (OTC) transactions result in a highly inefficient financial system 
(higher systemic risk) in which a clearinghouse or central authority would be beneficial in 
providing multilateral netting agreements to stabilize the system and lower information 
asymmetry. In conclusion, such a web of interconnected obligations can result in higher 
network risks. These risks of financial fragility and contagion seem to vary of time. 
2.4 Returning periods of stability and instability 
Minsky (1957) finds that the financial industry undergoes waves of innovation, regulation, 
and deregulation, hence periods of stability and instability. New financial innovations and 
deregulated environments often end in increased instability and a crisis. Thus, most crises and 
periods of instability have common underlying features. Also, every time after a crisis, 
regulation develops, increases and is said to prevent future crisis. For example, before the 
banking and credit crisis that started in 2007, Basel II was said to increase the capital base and 
risk control of banks by accounting to credit, market and operational risk. However, as 
Minsky (1957) predicted, financial innovations found ―loopholes‖ and gave rise to nonbank 
financial institutions with major capital power. Such hedge funds, investment banks, private 
equity funds, mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies therefore provided 
investors with the highly looked after returns, avoided much of the regulation and produced 
themselves new financial products that finally turned the financial world again into a period 
of instability, as predicted by Minsky (1957). However, the resolving of these periods of 
instability are mostly at a high price and Adrian Bludnell-Wignall, a former Federal Bank 
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economist, even suspects that instability and crises are not resolved but rolled-over. Each time 
that a central bank responds with rate cuts, the new liquidity increase might simply lead to 
another and possibly even bigger bubble and crisis (Tan, 2007). As illustration, the Asian 
crisis was followed by the Long Term Capital Management crisis which in turn might have 
fuelled the dotcom bubble. This raises questions about how to create a countercyclical 
regulatory regime for capital and liquidity. Gieve (2008) noted, as a last alternative, to require 
larger capital and liquidity buffers across the whole cycle. Such cycles of stability and 
instability are expected to result, at times, in banking crises.  
2.5 Banking crises 
Banking crises experiences of the 19th and early 20th century were, until recently, the bases 
for research on large banking crises (Bernanke, 1983; Haubrich, 1990; Calomiris and Mason, 
1997). Especially the Great Depression caused various large bank failures around the world. 
A new wave of banking crises resurged in the 1990s during which Finland and Japan were 
only two examples giving potential for more in-depth research on past banking crises. 
Between World War II and the 1990s, a period of economic and financial stability with only a 
few isolated banking crises was recorded. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) see a calm 
macroeconomic environment, favourable economic growth, low inflation and pervasive 
controls on international capital flows as reasons that contributed to that financial stability. 
Also, bankers‘ freedom of action remained severely restricted due to high regulatory powers 
controlling price and quantity of credit. Even the turbulence of the 1970s did not destroy the 
soundness of banks due to presumably low real interest rates and high regulation. However, 
relaxing monetary policies and credit markets as well as increasing real interest rates led to 
several financial crises in developing countries during the 1980s. Besides developing 
countries, also developed countries such as the U.S. faced financial fragility such as during 
the savings and loans debacle due to eroding bank capital, generous deposit insurance and 
ineffective regulation following financial liberalization (Kane, 1989; Akerlof and Romer, 
1993). The beginning of the 1990s brought currency and asset devaluation in Scandinavia 
resulting in economic slowdown and severe banking crises (Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). 
Also in Japan, the collapse of the asset price bubble rendered the majority of the banking 
sector insolvent. However, Japanese regulatory forbearance, lax monetary policy and keiretsu 
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politics hindered the failing of poorly managed banks but instead kept the financing of poorly 
performing firms continue for over a decade (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004).  
On the other hand, the Mexican Tequila crisis was a combination of a faltering banking 
system, dollar-denominated debt, and political shocks leading to currency devaluation and a 
financial meltdown from December 1994 onwards (Calvo, 1996; Edwards and Végh, 1997). 
Bail-out costs reached up to 20 percent of GDP and even ten years later economic growth 
remained low.  
Evidence about how financial fragility can hurt a whole economy is found in the East Asian 
crises of 1997-8 during which sound public finance, high growth countries faced huge 
economic decline due to asset price devaluations as well as pulled out foreign capital 
(Lindgren et al., 1999).  
The U.S. bank and credit crisis that started in 2007 made a point in proving how 
interconnected the financial world is. Complicated structures of pools of mortgage bonds 
were overvalued due to high capital inflow, demand for AAA-bonds, flawed incentive 
structures and rating agencies. A boom in securitization of these pool of bonds led to 
information asymmetries and lost confidence, almost leading to a still stand of the financial 
world and collapses of major banks around the world. I look deeper into this crisis‘ origins in 
my case study in Section 4. 
In summary, I reported various macroeconomic origins of banking crises such as inflation, 
cyclical output downturns, terms of trade deterioration, exchange rate crashes, banking crises 
and currency, as well as asset and real estate devaluations (e.g. Lindgren et al., 1996; Dooley 
and Frankel, 2003; and Collyns and Kincaid, 2003). However, one origin that is common to 
almost all banking crises is of psychological nature to which Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) refer 
as the ―this time is different‖ thinking. Not surprisingly therefore, even Greenspan (2001) 
found the new ways of risk management of the 21 century to have made the financial world 
safer. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) already stated, also Greenspan was trapped into the 
―this time is different‖ thinking failure instead of acknowledging that the current financial 
system may inhibit imperfections and thus results in periods of instability. 
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2.6 Determinants of banking crises 
This section reviews earlier studies on the determinants of banking crises. Especially factors 
relating to financial liberalization, international shocks, exchange rate regimes, bank structure 
and ownership and institutional and political environment were found to influence the 
probability of a banking crisis.  
2.6.1 Financial Liberalization and Crises 
Caprio and Summers (1993) and Stiglitz (1994) express the concern that financial 
liberalization may lead to greater financial fragility as banks find greater opportunities for risk 
taking. Through limited liability, lax regulation and supervision, eroding bank capital and 
implicit as well as explicit guarantees, banks face only little downside risk and therefore often 
increase fragility beyond socially desirable limits (Stiglitz, 1994). The study of Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) shows that banking crises are indeed more likely to occur in 
financially liberalized countries, even after controlling for other country characteristics. 
However, as stated above, a strong institutional environment, respect for the rule of law, low 
corruption and good contract enforcement mitigate the negative effect of financial 
liberalization. Later empirical studies by Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999), Glick and Hutchison 
(2001), Arteta and Eichengreen (2002), and Noy (2004) also report that financial 
liberalization often arises within weak institutional environments leading to increased bank 
fragility. Also Balino and Sundarajan (1991), Gavin and Hausman (1995) and Bhatt (1995) 
confirm that financial liberalization leads to increased likelihood of banking crisis.  
2.6.2 International Shocks, Exchange Rate Regime and Crises 
The impact of worldwide economic shocks and exchange rate regimes on bank fragility is 
researched by Eichengreen and Fishlow (1998). They found that developing countries‘ 
financial difficulties and developed countries‘ tighter monetary conditions and slower growth 
are related. For example the monetary tightening in the U.S. in 1994 might have helped the 
Mexican tequila crisis to evolve. Eichengreen and Rose (1998) in addition report that 
international shocks such as interest rate and GDP growth changes had affected bank fragility 
in developing countries. However, later studies (e.g. Arteta and Eichengreen, 2002) found that 
the banking crises in the 1990s were different from all other crises with external factors being 
less important than domestic factors, thus weakening the results of Eichengreen and Rose 
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(1998). Concerning exchange rate regimes, Mundell (1961) found that flexible ones can 
stabilize financial systems and absorb effects of the real shocks on the economy. Flexible 
regimes may also prevent countries from dangerous lending booms through over-borrowing 
in foreign currency (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). On the other hand, fixed regimes 
limit lender of last resort operations as monetary expansion risks decrease confidence in the 
currency peg. Therefore, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes may be more prone to 
bank runs and financial panics (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Wood, 1999). On the other 
hand, Eichengreen and Rose (1998) feel that a currency peg commitment may reduce the 
likelihood of a banking crisis and discourage risk-taking by banks. However, especially 
developing countries often lack credibility and access to international markets. For those 
developing countries, exchange rate volatility is especially hurtful due to their high liability 
dollarization. Hence, fixed regimes increase transparency and credibility that also protects the 
country from contagion, argues Calvo (1999). Peria (2003) concludes that fixed regimes 
decrease the likelihood of a crisis but once a crisis is ongoing, the fixed regime will on 
average suffer higher costs. 
2.6.3 Bank Ownership, Structure and Crises 
The bank ownership structure (private vs. public, domestic vs. foreign) is argued to affect a 
bank‘s performance. Additionally, it is also shown that the likelihood of systemic banking 
crises is affected by the owners of the banks in the system. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001), 
and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) found that greater state ownership of 
banks results in political abuse, governance problems, reduced competition, poor productivity 
and lower growth. Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) 
show in a large sample that greater state ownership increases the probability of a banking 
crisis.  
Looking at foreign vs. domestic bank ownership, Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001) note that foreign entries are related to higher operating efficiency, better financial 
intermediation and long-term growth of the banking market. Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and 
Min (1998), Dages et al. (2000), Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Detragiache and Gupta 
(2004) proof any concern wrong about increased risk of contagion and volatility in the 
banking market through entries of foreign banks. Besides more concentrated banking systems 
and fewer regulatory restrictions on bank competition and activity, foreign entries also 
18 
increase competition and therefore decrease the probability of a banking crisis argue Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2004).  
2.6.4 The role of institutions 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) prove that a weaker institutional environment may be 
related to a higher probability of a banking crisis. Additionally, Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999) 
found that low transparency in financially liberalized markets lead to higher likelihood of a 
banking crisis.  
Explicit deposit insurances are originally designed to prevent bank runs and self-fulfilling 
panics but also create incentives for excessive risk-taking (Kane, 1989). Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) confirmed this finding by reporting explicit deposit insurances to increase 
the probability of banking crises, especially in interest rate deregulated and weak institutional 
environments. Thus, moral hazard is a greater problem in liberalized financial systems in 
which bank monitoring is more challenging. Also, the design of the deposit insurance is 
affecting the probability of a banking crisis as lower coverage, coinsurance, private sector 
involvement in the scheme‘s management, ex-post funding and mandatory membership are 
associated with lower levels of bank fragility.  
Regarding bank regulation and supervision affecting banking crises, Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2004) found that regulatory and supervisory practices that insist on accurate information 
disclosure, empowerment of private sector monitoring of banks and the fostering of incentives 
for private agents to exert control on banks, are optimal to promote bank performance and 
stability.  
2.6.5 The Political System and Crises 
Political considerations may play a very important role in government decisions to deal with 
insolvent institutions and more generally with establishing a sound banking system. Kroszner 
(1997) suggests that it is most important to ensure transparency in government policies and 
decisions; competition; legislative oversight of regulation; and the possibility of foreign bank 
entries. Concerning politics and their dealing with insolvent institutions, Brown and Dinc 
(2004) report that failing banks are less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose 
their licenses before elections than after elections.  
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2.7 Effects and implications of banking crises 
The empirical part of this study investigates the effects of banking crises. Reviewing this 
question from a theoretical point of view, I discuss the credit crunch and bank relationship 
loss hypotheses as well as the crisis‘ theoretical effect on output loss and fiscal cost. 
2.7.1 The credit crunch hypothesis 
During banking crises, banks may decrease credit to firms which in turn lower expenditure 
and investment. This decrease lowers consumption, aggregate demand and employment and 
possibly drives firms into illiquidity. Distressed banks and consecutive bank runs and bank 
failures may threaten the payment system‘s soundness, thus increasing transaction costs. 
These mechanisms suggest that distressed banks hinder the rest of the economy. Such lower 
credit supply than demand is called ―credit crunch‖ (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; 
and Bernanke, 1983) 
Additionally, banking crises increase agency problems and lending relationships become 
more complicating as banks may abandon risky borrowers and/or raise spreads. Thus, output 
and bank credit may decline during banking crises even without feedback effects from bank 
distress to credit availability. However, inflation and exchange rate effects may mix up credit 
valuations as well as credit restructurings with off-balance sheet vehicles, thus appearing as a 
deeper decline of credit than in reality (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005).  
In past banking crises mixed evidence on the credit crunch hypothesis was found. Bernanke et 
al. (1991) report a credit crunch in the U.S. during 1990, Domac and Ferri (1999) didn‘t find a 
credit crunch in Malaysia and Korea during the East Asian crisis whereas Gosh and Gosh 
(1999) confirmed a credit crunch for Indonesia and Korea during the same crisis.  
Rajan, Detragiache and Dell‘Ariccia (2008), examined the output consequences of a credit 
crunch following banking crises, while using micro and industry data. They found that 
industries more dependent on external finance are more negatively affected during banking 
crises. This confirms the credit crunch hypothesis, argue Rajan, Detragiache and Dell‘Ariccia 
(2008). They observe that more financially dependent sectors indeed lose about 1 percentage 
point of growth more in each crisis year, compared to industries that are less dependent on 
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external finance. This effect becomes even stronger in developing countries where private 
sectors may have less access to foreign capital. 
2.7.2 Bank relationship and information loss hypothesis 
The corporate slogan of Chase Manhattan Bank in 1998 sums it all up; ―the right relationship 
is everything‖. However, banking crises often force banks into bankruptcy, a merger or 
downsizing where valuable bank-to-customer relationships and knowledge are lost. Many 
bank employees, credit officers and bank managers might have changed departments, banks 
or the industry. As seen, banks are providers of liquidity by granting loans. Banks are 
supposed to ―lean against the wind‖ (Smith and Ongena, 2002) by accommodating debtors 
during difficult times. Hence, valuable bank relationship, bank services and information get 
lost during banking crises. 
Bank defaults can create deadweight costs if lost customers reputations decrease future 
borrowing ability (de Lange, 1992) because a new bank relationship requires the new bank to 
accumulate information which comes at a cost (Stiglitz, 1992). Djankov, Jindra and Klapper 
(1999) confirmed a decrease in the firm‘s market value upon announcement of its main 
bank‘s closure. Besides bank defaults, already formal actions against a bank, dispositions of 
failed or failing banks or voluntary bank mergers will cause temporary disruptions in banking 
services. Jiangli, Unal and Yom (2006) reported higher credit availability for firms with 
multiple-bank relationships during the Asian Financial Crisis. Miyajima and Arikawa (2006) 
analyzed the Japanese Financial Crisis of the 1990‘s and found that firms most affected by the 
crisis had common characteristics. These firms had high leverage, lower R&D expenditures, 
lower profitability, difficulty in accessing capital markets and high dependence on their main 
bank. Additionally, contrary to theory, main banks were found to delay firms from 
restructuring. Overall Miyajima and Arikawa (2006) concluded that the main bank system 
may have been an ―impediment to creative destruction‖ during the period of the banking 
crisis. Also Brewer et al. (2002) researched the Japanese Financial Crisis, noting that bank 
failures affected their customers‘ market value the more the customers had less access to 
alternative funding. However, the bank failure was ―bad news‖ for all firms in the economy 
and the banking crisis resulted overall in high economical cost. 
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2.7.3 Banking crises and economical costs 
Few empirical studies of banking crises examine how banking crises affect the rest of the 
economy. Summarizing several case studies, Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) conclude that 
bank fragility has adversely affected economic growth. More systematic empirical 
investigations have also shown that output growth and private credit growth drop significantly 
below normal in the years around banking crises (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache., 2005). Bordo et al. (2001) show that 
financial crises (currency crises, banking crises, or both) entailed similar-sized output losses 
in recent years as compared to previous historical periods. Crises, however, are more frequent 
now than during the gold standard and Bretton Woods periods, and are as frequent now as in 
the interwar years. Hoggarth et al. (2002) prove that output losses associated with banking 
crises are not more severe in developing countries than in developed countries. Claessens, 
Klingebiel and Laeven (2003) showed that economic output loss is not decreased through 
more government intervention and higher fiscal cost. 
2.7.4 Banking crises and fiscal costs 
Fiscal costs due to banking crises mostly result from government interventions in the crisis 
and foregone tax revenues due to banking crisis output losses. The question about the optimal 
government intervention in banking crises is important to policymakers but difficult to answer 
through empirical analysis. One problem is that compiling accurate information on 
intervention policies for a large enough sample of crises is a laborious task. Another difficulty 
is that the sequence, timing, and specific modalities of bank support strategies are crucial to 
the outcome. A few studies have used cross-country empirical analysis to study which 
intervention policies can minimize the costs of a banking crisis (Claessens, Klingebiel, and 
Laeven, 2003, Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003).  
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) attempted to quantitatively measure government intervention. 
They constructed a database with estimates of the fiscal cost of forty banking crises and 
catalogued the policies adopted in each episode. These policies were classified according to 
five broad categories: blanket guarantees to depositors, liquidity support to banks, bank 
recapitalization, financial assistance to debtors, and forbearance. With this database, the 
authors explore how the different intervention policies affect the fiscal cost of the bailout, 
22 
after controlling for country and crisis characteristics. They conclude that more generous 
bailouts resulted in higher fiscal costs.  
Also Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2003) found that extensive liquidity support, 
government guarantees on financial institutions‘ liabilities and forbearance from prudential 
regulation add to the fiscal costs of resolving the banking crisis. Moreover, Claessens, 
Klingebiel and Laeven (2003) explore the relationship between intervention policies and the 
economic costs of crises. Costs are measured by the output loss relative to trend during the 
crisis episode. The main finding is that generous support to the banking system does not 
reduce the output cost of banking crises. However, since omitted exogenous shocks may 
simultaneously cause a stronger output decline and more generous intervention measures, the 
interpretation of the results is ambiguous. Nevertheless, they conclude that countries are 
advised to use strict policies to resolve a crisis and focus on structural reforms that help avoid 
future systemic crises. It is also to note that their results survived even after the authors 
control for a large set of variables such as GDP growth prior to crisis, existence of deposit 
insurance, inflation rate at the onset of the crisis, state ownership of banks and degree of 
dollarization. 
Regarding the political side of government interventions, Keefer (2001) notes that when 
voters are well informed, elections are close and there are many veto players, governments 
incur smaller fiscal costs of banking crises. Thus, transparency, information dissemination 
and competition amongst interest groups play an important role in shaping crisis response 
policies. 
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3 Empirical part  
The first empirical part looks at the determinants of banking crises by estimating the 
significance of various determinants‘ impact on the likelihood of an occurrence of a banking 
crisis. By optimizing a multivariate logit model‘s maximum likelihood function I obtain 
empirical results which are thereafter discussed and compared to theory and earlier research 
findings. The second empirical part investigates how banking crises impact the crises‘ 
outcomes, defined as slowed growth and higher fiscal cost. Banking crises‘ effects are 
explored by employing ordinary least squares regressions. 
3.1 Empirical part I: Determinants of banking crises 
According to the literature review, banking crises may disrupt the flow of credit, reduce 
investments and may force viable firms into bankruptcy. Thus, a banking crisis can cause a 
decline in wealth. Understanding therefore the origins and the mechanism behind banking 
crises with the goal of preventing the occurrence of a systemic crisis is a major objective for 
policymakers. Finding features in the economic environment that tend to enforce banking 
sector fragility and that lead to systemic crises is an important research field. In this empirical 
research I therefore study factors associated with the emergence of systemic banking crises. I 
employ a multivariate logit model in a large sample of developed and developing countries 
between 1980 and 2005. As feedback effects may affect some of the explanatory variables 
after the onset of a crisis, I construct two sets of regressions. In the first set of regressions I 
eliminate all observations from the data panel following a banking crisis. In the second set of 
regressions I eliminate all data observations while the banking crisis is on-going.  
Macroeconomic variables as well as structural characteristics of the economy in general and 
of the financial sector in particular are included into the maximum likelihood function. I 
describe the variables and hypotheses, as well as the methodology and data used. Thereafter, 
an extensive discussion about the results follows. I find that low GDP growth, highly 
developed institutional and regulatory environments and high GDP per capita increase the 
probability of a banking crisis. 
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3.1.1 Banking crises determinants and hypotheses 
On the basis of the literature review, I describe the chosen variables and hypothesize how 
these variables influence the probability of a banking crisis. Table 1 summarizes the chosen 
variables and their description, while Table 2 summarizes, based on previous research, the 
variables hypothesized impact on banking crises probabilities. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the determinants of banking crises 
This table describes the variables used in the empirical part I on determinants of banking crises. This table‘s column 
―Explanation‖ describes the origins of the variables. Year t equals the year of the start of the banking crisis. The data 
sources are described in parantheses. 
Dependent Variable Explanation 
BANKING CRISIS Dummy equals 1 if a banking crisis exists in year t in the 
specific country k (obtained from the database by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008)) 
 
Explanatory Variables  
Macroeconomic 
variables  
 
GDPGROWTH Rate of growth of real GDP in year t (obtained from IFS) 
REALINTEREST Treasury bill interest rate in year t (obtained from IFS) 
INFLATION Rate of change of the GDP deflator in year t (obtained from 
IFS) 
Financial variable  
M2RESERVES Ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank in 
year t (both obtained from IFS) 
Institutional variable  
CREDITORIGHT Ordinal variable ranging from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 
(strong creditor rights), based on an index of aggregated 
creditor rights (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007) 
GDPCAP GDP per capita in year t (obtained from WEO and IFS) 
Alternative variable  
FINREFORM Dummy equals 1 during the period [t, t+5] if the country was 
undergoing a large financial reform (obtained from the database 
by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008)) 
Past crisis variable  
LASTCRISISDURATION Measures the time (in years) that passed by since the last 
banking crisis in year t 
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Table 2. Summary of hypothesized and empirical findings of determinants’ relation to 
banking crises 
This table shows the variables used in the empirical part I on determinants of banking crises. GDPGROWTH equals the 
rate of growth of the real GDP, REALINTEREST equals the treasury bill interest rate, INFLATION equals the rate of 
change of the GDP deflator, M2RESERVES equals the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, 
CREDITORIGHT equals an index of aggregated creditor rights by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), GDPCAP 
equals the GDP per capita, FINREFORM equals a dummy which is equal to 1 if the country was undergoing a large 
financial reform (obtained from the database by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008), and LASTCRISISDURATION 
measures the time that passed by since the last banking crisis. All variables were obtained from IFS if not specified 
otherwise. The column ―previous empirical evidence‖ shows earlier research on which our hypotheses are based. The 
column ―hypothesized relation to the probability of a banking crisis‖ describes how each determinant is hypothesized to 
influence the probability of a banking crisis. Finally, the column ―empirical results on the relation to the probability of a 
banking crisis‖ shows the results of this empirical part I (Table 5 and 6) where the determinants‘ impact was tested in a 
multivariate logit model. 
Explanatory 
variables 
Previous empirical evidence Hypothesized 
relation to the 
probability of 
a banking 
crisis (based 
on previous 
empirical 
evidence) 
Empirical 
results on the 
relation to the 
probability of a 
banking crisis 
(Table 5 and 
Table 6) 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
   
GDPGROWTH Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) 
Negative Negative 
REALINTEREST Galbis (1993), Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997) 
Positive Positive 
INFLATION Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) Positive Negative 
Financial 
variable 
   
M2RESERVES Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) 
Positive Negative 
Institutional 
variable 
   
CREDITORIGHT Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997), LLSV (1999) 
Negative Positive 
GDPCAP Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) 
Negative Positive 
Alternative 
variable 
   
FINREFORM Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) 
Positive Negative/ 
unclear 
Past crisis 
variable 
   
LASTCRISIS 
DURATION 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) 
Positive Negative 
 
  
26 
3.1.1.1 Dependent variable 
A systemic banking crisis is defined, exactly as in Laeven and Valencia (2008), as one where 
the country‘s corporate and financial sector experiences a large number of defaults and 
difficulties in timely repaying of contracts. Also, non-performing loans increase sharply and 
most of the aggregate capital in the banking system may be exhausted. Alongside depressed 
asset prices, sharp increases in real interest rates and slowed capital flow is often observable. 
Each crisis event and starting date is cross-checked with whether it coincides with deposit 
runs, deposit freezes, extensive liquidity support, large proportions of non-performing loans, 
or bank interventions. 
3.1.1.2 Explanatory variables 
My choice of explanatory variables reflects the results of earlier studies (Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1997, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
2000, and Shehzad and De Haan, 2009), as well as the literature review on origins of banking 
crisis and data availability. I grouped the variables into macroeconomic, financial, 
institutional, alternative and past crisis variables sections. 
Macroeconomic variables 
The variable GDPGROWTH equals the rate of growth of real GDP. Low GDP growth 
reflects adverse macroeconomic shocks that hurt banks through higher rates of non-
performing loans. Thus the probability of a banking crisis is expected to be negatively related 
to the variable GDPGROWTH, exactly as Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) argue. 
REALINTEREST signifies the short-term real interest rate that is inflation-adjusted. High 
short-term real interest rates affect banks negatively if they are not able to quickly pass the 
higher interests on to their customers (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). Also, real 
interest rates might proxy financial liberalization as suggested in Galbis (1993). Higher 
interest rates may increase opportunities for excessive risk-taking and fraud, thereby 
increasing financial fragility. I also introduce the variable INFLATION which is specified as 
the rate of change of the GDP deflator. I argue that the variable measuring inflation reflects 
macroeconomic mismanagement in which high inflation is a sign for a price bubble (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2008).  
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Financial variable 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) found that inflation and large capital inflows often preceded 
crises. I suggest to measure sudden capital in- or outflows and a country‘s vulnerability to 
balance-of-payment problems (Calvo, 1996) as ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of 
the central bank, named M2RESERVES. I expect, exactly as Calvo (1996) and Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997), the variable measuring M2 to reserves to positively relate to the 
probability of a banking crisis. 
Institutional variables  
I introduce the variable GDPCAP which equals the GDP per capita and shall reflect the basic 
institutional environment and efficiency of the country. Exactly as Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997), I also hypothesize that lower values of GDPCAP increase the probability 
of a banking crisis. 
H1.11 Low GDP growth, high real interest rates, high inflation, high M2 to foreign 
exchange reserves and low GDP per capita increase the probability of a 
banking crisis in the data panel that excludes years after the first banking crisis. 
H2.11 Low GDP growth, high real interest rates, high inflation, high M2 to foreign 
exchange reserves and low GDP per capita increase the probability of a 
banking crisis in the panel that excludes years while the banking crisis is 
ongoing.  
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (LLSV) introduced a database of creditor rights 
around the globe in the year 1999. This database was extended and yearly recorded for 129 
countries by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). Their index of aggregated creditor rights 
focuses on whether rights of secured lenders are defined in laws and regulations; secured 
creditors are able to seize their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved; secured 
creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and whether 
management doesn‘t retain administration of its property during the resolution of the 
reorganization. The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights) 
and is constructed as at January of every year. This variable is introduced as 
CREDITORIGHT and is hypothesized to reflect the economic wide impact of the legal 
system. A weak regulation might higher the likelihood of a banking crisis as suggested by 
LLSV (1999) and Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). However, GDPCAP and 
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CREDITORIGHT might be difficult to disentangle as these earlier studies reported strong 
correlations. 
H1.12 Low creditor rights increase the probability of banking crises in the data panel 
that excludes years after the first banking crisis. 
H2.12 Low creditor rights increase the probability of banking crises in the panel that 
excludes years while the banking crisis is ongoing. 
An alternative variable 
To test financial liberalization, the variable FINREFORM is introduced which is based on a 
study by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) for the time span of 1973 to 2005. The 
dummy FINREFORM equals 1 for five years if the country was undergoing a large financial 
reform as identified in Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008). I hypothesize that financial 
liberalizations increases financial fragility and the likelihood of financial crises, exactly as 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) have shown in their study on determinants of banking crises.  
H1.13 Financial reforms increase the probability of banking crises in the data panel 
that excludes years after the first banking crisis. 
Past crisis variable 
For the second set of regressions in which I exclude the period between the start and end of 
the crisis, the variable LASTCRISISDURATION is included which measures the time that 
passed by since the last crisis. Exactly as Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), I 
hypothesize that the probability of a new banking crisis increases with the time as new 
problems after the last crisis accumulate again.  
H2.13 The more time that passed by since the last banking crisis, the more increases the 
probability of a new banking crisis in the panel that excludes years while the 
banking crisis is ongoing. 
H2.14 The more time that passed by since the last banking crisis as well as financial 
reforms increase the probability of banking crises in the panel that excludes 
years while the banking crisis is ongoing. 
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3.1.2 Methodology: Multivariate logit approach 
There exist two different methodologies to research the determinants of banking crises; the 
signals approach and the multivariate logit approach. I chose to employ the multivariate logit 
approach as this approach fits our research question optimally. This choice becomes evident 
when looking at both possible approaches closely. 
3.1.2.1 Signals Approach 
The signals approach was first applied to research determinants of banking crises by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). They found that before the start of banking crises, monetary 
growth and interest rates (lending and deposit rates) were above normal, showing a high 
demand for money and credit. Additionally, export growth appeared below trend and real 
exchange rates were appreciating. Eight months before the peak of the banking crisis, output 
growth falls below trend while stock prices peak, suggesting that banking crises are preceded 
by a cyclical downturn, as argued by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
Using the signals approach in the econometric analysis of determinants of banking crises, a 
variable is deemed to signal a crisis any time it crosses a particular threshold during the 24 
months prior a crisis. Each signals threshold is chosen to minimize the in-sample noise-to-
signal ratio. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find the appreciation of real exchange rates, 
equity prices and the money multiplier to be the strongest signals for a banking crisis. 
However, even these strongest signals would not issue a signal in 73-79 percent of the 
observations during the 24 months preceding a crisis. Furthermore, each possible covariate is 
considered in isolation and thus aggregate information provided by each indicator is getting 
lost in that econometric model. Additionally, thresholds are always ―black and white‖ because 
they ignore signals that almost crossed the threshold or were far above it. This is presumably 
important in assessing fragility.  
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) proof that the crises probabilities estimated through a 
multivariate logit framework result in lower in-sample type I and type II errors compared to 
the signals of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) 
confirmed that the multivariate logit approach is better and more suitable. Therefore I 
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estimate the probability of a banking crisis using a multivariate logit model, exactly as in the 
original application by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
5
  
3.1.2.2 The multivariate logit model 
I estimate the probability of a banking crisis using a multivariate logit model, exactly as in 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). In the multivariate logit approach, the probability of 
a crisis occurrence equals a function of a vector of explanatory variables. A logit econometric 
model is fit to the data and an estimate of the crisis probability is obtained by maximizing the 
likelihood function. Therefore, the model produces a summary measure of fragility, the 
estimated probability of a crisis, which makes the best possible usage of information in the 
explanatory variables. More formally, in each period the country either experiences a crisis, or 
doesn‘t. Thus, my dependent variable, the crisis dummy, takes either the value zero if there is 
no crisis or the value one if there is a crisis. I hypothesize that the probability that a crisis will 
occur at a particular time in a particular country is a function of a vector of n explanatory 
variables       . Let        denote the crisis dummy variable that takes the value of one 
when a banking crisis occurs in a country   at time  , and a value zero otherwise.   is a vector 
of unknown coefficients and             is the cumulative probability distribution function 
evaluated at         . Therefore, the log-likelihood function of the model for the hypotheses 
1.11 to 2.14 is: 
      
 
     
                                                    
 
     
 
 
This probability distribution inhibits the logistic functional form which is commonly used in 
studying banking difficulties (Cole and Gunther, 1993, Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al., 1997). 
Thus, the regression results‘ estimated coefficients don‘t indicate the increase in probability 
of a crisis given a one-unit increase in the corresponding explanatory variables. Instead, the 
coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an explanatory variable on  
                      where the increase in probability depends upon the original 
probability of the initial values of all the independent variables and their coefficients. Hence 
the coefficient‘s sign indicates the direction of the change but the magnitude depends on the 
                                                 
5
 Further applications are found in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2000), and Shehzad and De Haan (2009). 
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slope of the cumulative distribution function         . Therefore, the countries‘ changes in 
explanatory variables have different effects on the probability of a crisis depending on the 
countries‘ initial crises probabilities. The logistic specification means that very high or low 
initial probabilities of crises will be little affected by marginal changes of independent 
variables over time whereas the same marginal changes have greater effect on countries with 
intermediate initial crises probabilities.  
After the onset of crises I am expecting feedback effects to affect some of the explanatory 
variables such as real interest rates (loosened monetary policies) which then again will 
destroy a clear relationship. Therefore, in the first set of regressions (Hypotheses 1.11 to 1.13) 
I eliminate all observations from the panel following a banking crisis. However, this also 
means that I am going to lose many observations for the 1990s and 2000s and 23 banking 
crises that occurred as second, third or fourth crises in the same country. In the second set of 
regressions (Hypotheses 2.11 to 2.14) I identify the year in which each banking crisis ended 
based on information available in existing case studies and from Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
for the second set of regressions in which I eliminate only the years between the start and end 
of the crisis in order to take into account possible feedback problems. In case no information 
on the end of a banking crisis was available, I assumed the crisis ended at t+4. Hypotheses 2‘s 
disadvantage is how I identify the crises‘ ends and whether these results are reliable. In 
addition, I argue that a country with a crisis in the past has a different likelihood of crisis in 
the future. This hypothesis will be taken into account by introducing a variable which records 
the duration since the last crisis. 
Exactly as in the study of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), I will not include any 
country fixed effects as this would require omitting all countries that did not experience a 
banking crisis which would result in a biased sample.  
Each hypothesis 1.11- 1.13 and 2.11- 2.14 is statistically different from zero if the model chi-
square is statistically significant at the 1, 5 or 10% level. 
3.1.3 Data 
In contrast to the study by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) who research banking 
crises between 1980 and 1994, I am choosing a larger time frame. I am researching the 
probability of a banking crisis during 1980 and 2005. Initially, all countries in the IFS were 
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included. Thereafter, most centrally planned economies, as well as most economies in 
transition which proved to be outliers, were excluded. Only, Hungary, Poland and Romania 
stayed within the average range and were kept in the sample. Additionally, a few more 
countries had to be excluded due to data unavailability. This process of elimination left us 
with a number of countries ranging from a maximum of 121 to a minimum of 120 countries 
depending on the specification of the regression. Appendix A1 reflects the list of countries 
included in the sample. The 65 banking crises (Hypothesis 1) and 80 banking crises 
(Hypothesis 2), respectively, are taken from the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008). The 
data on creditor rights was obtained from an index of aggregated creditor rights by Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) and the data on financial reforms was obtained from the 
database by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008). From IMF‘s IFS database and world 
economic outlook (WEO) I obtained the data for the remaining variables (Table 1). 
Nevertheless, some single data points were still missing, thus some observations included in 
the panel do not cover the entire 1980 to 2005 time period. The dataset for Hypotheses 2 
consists eventually of 2755 country-year observations (24795 data points) that are not 
associated with bank crises year observations. 
3.1.3.1 Descriptive statistics of banking crises’ costs 
Before reporting the empirical findings about how and whether the chosen determinants 
influence banking crises, Table 3 and Table 4 report the variables‘ mean, standard deviation, 
student‘s t-distribution and their 95% confidence interval. As expected, these variables 
differed most of the time substantially from their means as macroeconomic factors may have 
fundamentally changed over the decades. Table 4 shows that many variables are, as expected, 
statistically significantly correlated. High inflation is significantly correlated to low GDP 
growth and to high real interest rates, both times at the 1% level (2-tailed). Strong creditor 
rights are statistically significantly correlated to higher GDP per capita at the 1% level (2-
tailed). Finally, financial reforms are statistically significantly correlated to higher real interest 
rates, higher inflation and higher creditor rights. Clearly, any conclusion about individual 
determinants‘ influences on the probability of a banking crisis has to take into account these 
correlations.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of banking crises’ determinants 
Table 3 describes banking crises determinants‘ most important statistical values. The first empirical study‘s variable 
GDPGROWTH equals the rate of growth of the real GDP, REALINTEREST equals the treasury bill interest rate, 
INFLATION equals the rate of change of the GDP deflator, M2RESERVES equals the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange 
reserves of the central bank, GDPCAP equals the GDP per capita, CREDITORIGHT equals an index of aggregated 
creditor rights by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), and FINREFORM equals a dummy which is equal to 1 if the 
country was undergoing a large financial reform (obtained from the database by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008).  
Variable Mean Std. Deviation t-distribution 
95% confidence interval 
Lower Upper 
GDPGROWTH  
(in %) 
3.18 5.55 30.48 0.20 6.56 
REALINTEREST 
(in %) 
8.94 7.50 45.63 0.38 18.26 
INFLATION 
(in %) 
12.85 26.97 18.27 0.89 27.09 
M2RESERVES 0.73 3.59 7.82 0.18 1.65 
GDPCAP 16689.12 15617.35 33.50 977.49 34355.73 
CREDITORIGHT 1.31 1.31 53.62 0.04 2.68 
FINREFORM 0.11 0.32 19.28 0.01 0.24 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix of banking crises’ determinants 
This Table 4 presents cross sectional Pearson correlations for regression variables of the first empirical study on the 
determinants of banking crises. REALINTEREST equals the treasury bill interest rate, INFLATION equals the rate of 
change of the GDP deflator, M2RESERVES equals the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, 
GDPCAP equals the GDP per capita, CREDITORIGHT equals an index of aggregated creditor rights by Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), and FINREFORM equals a dummy which is equal to 1 if the country was undergoing a 
large financial reform (obtained from the database by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008). The sample period is from 
1980 to 2005. ** indicate that the variables are statistically significantly correlated at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Variables 
GDP 
GROWTH 
REAL 
INTEREST 
INFLA- 
TION 
M2 
RESERVES 
 GDPCAP 
CREDITO- 
RIGHT 
REAL 
INTEREST 
-0.0399 1 
    
INFLATION **-0.0594 **0.2776 1   
  
M2RESERVES -0.0140 0.0005 0.0311 1 
  
GDPCAP 0.0353 -0.0103 -0.0112 -0.0040 1 
 
CREDITO 
RIGHT 
0.0344 -0.0048 0.0036 -0.0276 **0.115 1 
FINREFORM 0.0026 **0.0915 **0.0912 -0.0104 0.0387 **0.1493 
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3.1.4 Empirical findings of determinants of banking crises 
Table 5 and 6 contain the main results of the multivariate logit regressions of the determinants 
of banking crises. Table 5 reports the results for the hypotheses 1.11 to 1.13, using the panel 
that excludes years after the first banking crisis. Table 6 reports the results for the hypotheses 
2.11 to 2.14, in which the panel excludes years while banking crises are ongoing.  
The quality of each model is assessed with three criteria, as in Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997) and Amemiya (1981): model chi-square, Akaike‘s information criterion 
(AIC), and in-sample classification accuracy. The model chi-square tests the joint significance 
of the regressors by comparing the likelihood of the model with that of a model with only the 
intercept. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Banking Crises Results—Panel Excluding Years After the 
First Banking Crisis 
This Table 5 shows the results of the multivariate logit regressions for hypotheses 3.11 to 3.13 of the first empirical study 
on the determinants of banking crises. I regressed the dependent variable, BANKINGCRISIS, on a set of variables in a 
maximum likelihood function. The dependent variable takes the value one if there is a crisis and the value zero otherwise. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. GDPGROWTH equals the rate of growth of the real GDP, REALINTEREST 
equals the treasury bill interest rate, INFLATION equals the rate of change of the GDP deflator, M2RESERVES equals 
the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, GDPCAP equals the GDP per capita, CREDITORIGHT 
equals an index of aggregated creditor rights by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), and FINREFORM equals a 
dummy which is equal to 1 if the country was undergoing a large financial reform (obtained from the database by Abiad, 
Detragiache and Tressel, 2008). ―% total correct‖, ―% crisis correct‖, and ―% no-crisis correct‖ shows how many 
observations where classified overall, as crisis and as no-crisis, correctly. * /** /*** denotes statistical significance on the 
10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
   Dependent variable: BANKINGCRISIS 
Explanatory variables 1.11 1.12 1.13 
Constant  -3.4648 *** (0.148) -3.6330 ***  (0.2001) -3.6297 *** (0.1923) 
GDPGROWTH -.0602 *** (0.20) -0.0609 *** (0.0206) -0.0607 *** (0.0206) 
REALINTEREST 0.0005 ** (0.001) 0.0006 ** (0.0003) 0.0006 ** (0.0002) 
INFLATION -0.00007 (0.001) -.0001 (0.0006) -0.0001 (0.0006) 
M2RESERVES -0.0027 (0.0006) -0.0018 (0.0134) -0.0018 (0.0134) 
CREDITORIGHT 
 
0.1359 (0.0956) 0.1369 (0.0964) 
GDPCAP 0.00001 ** (0.0002) 
0.00001 ** 
(0.000001) 
0.00001 ** (0.000001) 
FINREFORM 
  
-0.0302 (0.0423) 
 
No. of crises 65 65 65 
No. of observations  2123 2123 2123 
No. of countries 120 120 120 
% total correct 84.6 84.7 85.6 
% crisis correct 30.5 30.7 34.1 
% no-crisis correct 99.2 99.0 98.1 
Model chi-square 19 *** 21.82 *** 21.8 *** 
Akaike‘s information 
criterion (AIC) 
282.16 282.19 283 
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Table 6. Determinants of Banking Crises Results—Panel Excluding Years While the Crisis is 
On-Going 
This Table 6 shows the results of the multivariate logit regressions for hypotheses 4.11 to 4.14 of the empirical study I on 
the determinants of banking crises. I regressed the dependent variable, BANKINGCRISIS, on a set of variables through a 
maximum likelihood function. The dependent variable takes the value one if there is a crisis and the value zero otherwise. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. GDPGROWTH equals the rate of growth of the real GDP, REALINTEREST 
equals the treasury bill interest rate, INFLATION equals the rate of change of the GDP deflator, M2RESERVES equals the 
ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, GDPCAP equals the GDP per capita, CREDITORIGHT equals 
an index of aggregated creditor rights by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), FINREFORM equals a dummy which is 
equal to 1 if the country was undergoing a large financial reform (obtained from the database by Abiad, Detragiache and 
Tressel, 2008), and LASTCRISISDURATION measures the time that passed by since the last banking crisis. All variables 
were obtained from IFS if not specified otherwise. ―% total correct‖, ―% crisis correct‖, and ―% no-crisis correct‖ shows 
how many observations weere classified overall, as crisis and as no-crisis, correctly. * /** /*** denotes statistical 
significance on the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: BANKINGCRISIS 
Explanatory variables 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 
Constant  -3.4636 *** 
(0.1291) 
-3.5880 *** 
(0.1782) 
-3.5795 *** 
(0.2876) 
-3.6210 *** 
(0.2898) 
GDPGROWTH -0.0724 *** 
(0.22) 
-0.0730 *** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0742 *** 
(0.0212) 
-0.0743 *** 
(0.0212) 
REALINTEREST 0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
INFLATION -0.0004 
(0.0014) 
-0.0005 
(0.0015) 
-0.0009 
(0.0022) 
-0.0008 
(0.0022) 
M2RESERVES -0.0017 
(0.0096) 
-0.0015 
(0.0097) 
-0.0015 
(0.0070) 
-0.0015 
(0.0070) 
CREDITORIGHT 
 
0.0938 
(0.0872) 
0.1452 
(0.1372) 
0.1219 
(0.1383) 
GDPCAP 0.0001 ** 
(0.000001) 
0.0001 * 
(0.000001) 
0.0001 ** 
(0.000001) 
0.0001 * 
(0.000001) 
FINREFORM 
 
 
 0.6520 * 
(0.3841) 
LASTCRISISDURATION 
 
 
-1.0203 ** 
(0.4776) 
-1.0142 ** 
(0.4685) 
 
No. of crises 80 80 80 80 
No. of observations 
(crisis/no-crisis) 
2835 2835 2835 2835 
No. of countries 121 121 121 121 
% total correct 46.42 46.56 49.98 49.84 
% crisis correct 42.50 42.50 42 43.50 
% no-crisis correct 73.83 73.83 74 73.18 
Model chi-square 30.16 *** 31.30*** 101.98*** 104.67 *** 
AIC 354.20 354.63 320.29 319.95 
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First, all model chi-square values confirm that each model (1.11-1.13, and 2.11-1.13) rejects, 
at the one percent significance level, the hypothesis that the variables‘ coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. Also Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) find that all their models reject 
the hypothesis that the variables‘ coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
Second, the AIC criterion is found by computing as minus the log-likelihood function of the 
model plus the number of parameters being estimated. Thus, the smaller AIC the better is the 
model. AIC is important in comparing models with different degrees of freedom. Table 5, 
regression 2.11 performs best. However, the difference to hypotheses 1.12 and 1.13 is very 
small with 0.03 and 0.84, respectively. Table 6 on the other hand, shows larger differences in 
AIC values between the different regressions. Hypothesis 2.14 with an AIC of 319.95 reports 
the lowest value. Therefore, hypotheses 2.13 and 2.14 are better models, in which the 
statistically significant variables measuring financial reforms and the duration since the last 
banking crisis are added. Overall, I conclude that Table 5, excluding years after the first 
banking crisis, inhibits better regression models in terms of Akaike‘s information criterion 
(AIC). This finding is parallel to Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) who also report 
better AIC values for their models that exclude years after the first banking crisis.  
Third, in order to assess the predictive power and accuracy of the various specifications, I 
report the percentage of crises that are correctly classified (the cut-off probability is equal to 
the in-sample crisis frequency), the percentage of non-crises correctly classified and the total 
percentage of observations that are correctly classified. 
The models perform fairly well in terms of their classification accuracies. The overall 
classification accuracy varies between 85 to 86 percent in the panel excluding years after the 
first banking crisis and 46 to 50 percent in the panel excluding years during a banking crisis. 
The panel excluding years after the first banking crisis (table 5) performs overall better as 
seen by the fact that ca. 99 percent of the no-crisis years were correctly classified while 30 to 
34 percent of the crisis years were detected. The panel excluding years during a banking crisis 
(table 6) reports that only 73 to 74 percent of no-crisis were correctly classified. This resulted 
on the other hand in a higher percentage of correctly classified crisis periods, 42 to 44 percent. 
The percentage of correctly classified periods tends to be downplayed because in a number of 
episodes the estimated probability of a crisis increases significantly a few years before the 
episode begins or continues to be high even after the ―official‖ end of a banking crisis. Those 
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observations are considered as incorrectly classified by the accuracy criterion. Appendix A1 
reports more details about the classification accuracy of one of the best models, model 1.13. 
65 percent of the crisis episodes were not correctly classified by the model. While only one 
crisis was correctly classified, in 26.25 percent of additional cases the probability of a crisis 
jumped up already as early as three or more years prior to the starting date. In additional 6.25 
percent of the episodes, the model classifies as a crisis also the year before the beginning of 
the crisis. These results suggest that the elements that contribute to systemic banking sector 
fragility may be in place one or more years before problems become manifest. Also 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) came to the same conclusion and overall reported 
similar model accuracies. 
3.1.4.1 Significance of the explanatory variables 
This section discusses the significance of the explanatory variables and their implications. 
Despite the fact that the study by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiche (1997) has a smaller time 
frame and not the exact same set of variables, their variables‘ performance and results will be 
compared to this study. The variables in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiche (1997) keep their 
direction and magnitude across different set of variables and hypotheses, which helps a 
profound comparison. It has to be noted that any findings have to be treated with caution, as 
the coefficients come from a reduced form equation. This study doesn‘t provide a structural 
model that makes explicit connections among the various explanatory variables, exactly as in 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). 
Macroeconomic variables 
In both panels, low GDP growth is associated with a higher probability of a banking crisis, 
exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). This confirms that developments in the 
real side of the economy may be a major source of banking sector difficulties. Thus, higher 
rates of nonperforming loans may hurt banks and indirectly increase the likelihood of a 
banking crisis. Also, a small effect of real interest rate changes is visible. An increase in real 
interest rates increases the probability of a banking crisis, confirming the findings by 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). However, this variable is statistically significant in 
only a few of the models and the coefficient itself is very small. Nevertheless, higher interest 
rates may increase opportunities for excessive risk-taking and fraud, thereby increasing 
financial fragility.  
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Regarding the variable measuring inflation, any definite conclusion is not reached as all the 
coefficients are very small and statistically insignificant. The variable measuring inflation 
keeps nevertheless in all the model specification its negative direction, which would suggest 
that lower inflation increases the risk of banking crisis. This is against the theoretical 
assumption that inflation reflects macroeconomic mismanagement in which high inflation is a 
sign for a price bubble, as argued by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). The result is also contrary 
to Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) who observed a positive and significant relation 
between the variable measuring inflation and the probability of a banking crisis. However, 
inflation was significantly correlated to GDP growth and real interest rates. Thus, any 
conclusion about the variables measuring inflation, real interest rate and GDP growth and 
their individual influence on the probability of a banking crisis is difficult to make. 
Financial variable 
The ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, named M2RESERVES, 
measuring external vulnerability to capital outflow, does not seem to increase the probability 
of a crisis in any of the model specifications. This is contrary to the prediction in theory and 
the findings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). This variable, however, tends to be 
statistically insignificant and rather small which leaves us without any strong conclusion 
about the variable‘s impact on the probability of a banking crisis.  
Institutional variables  
Contrary to the predictions in theory and earlier studies (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998), the variable measuring creditor rights is increasing the probability of a banking crisis, 
the better creditor rights become. However, the results are statistically insignificant which 
leaves questions about the impact of creditor rights on the banking crisis likelihood. 
Additionally, the variable measuring creditor rights was found to be correlated to GDP per 
capita and financial reforms. Thus, some of these variables might be endogenous. In any case, 
no conclusion on each variable‘s individual influence on the probability of a banking crisis 
can be made. 
Also GDP per capita is contrary to the theoretical predictions positive, practically implying 
that higher GDP per capita leads to a higher probability of crisis. As Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997), I expected GDP per capita to reflect the basic institutional environment 
and efficiency of the country. However, it should be noted that it is difficult to disentangle the 
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effect of the creditor rights index from that of GDP per capita, given the high degree of 
correlation between the two variables in the sample. These two institutional variables together 
show a consistently positive effect of institutional development on the probability of a 
banking crisis. This is against the theoretical expectations and the findings by Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1997). 
Alternative variable 
In order to measure financial liberalization I introduced the variable measuring financial 
reforms which proves to statistically significantly increase the probability of a banking crisis 
in hypothesis 2.14. On the other hand, in hypothesis 1.13, financial reforms were negative but 
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, 2.14 shows that financial liberalizations can increase 
financial fragility and the likelihood of financial crises, exactly as Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996) conclude. On the other hand, financial reforms were found to be statistically 
significantly correlated to real interest rates and inflation. Therefore, it is difficult to 
disentangle each variables separate effect on the probability of a banking crisis. 
Past crisis variable 
The variable measuring the duration since the last banking crisis is only employed in model 
specifications 2.13 and 2.14 and is shown to be statistically significantly reducing the 
likelihood of a crisis the longer no new banking crisis arise. This finding could suggest that 
banking crises lead to periods of instability but once a country overrode instability, further 
crises become less likely. In 9% of the countries surveyed, two or more crisis were observed 
during 1980 and 2005. However, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the first crisis on the 
preceding crises from other macroeconomic effects, unrelated to the first crisis, which 
affected the next crisis. These findings are clearly contradicting the finding by Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997) who report that a new banking crisis‘ probability is increasing 
over time.  
Table 2 gives an overview on the variables‘ empirical evidence of their impact on the 
probability of a banking crisis. The best results are reported for GDP growth and the duration 
since the last crisis; both decrease the probability of a banking crisis the higher GDP growth is 
and the longer ago the last crisis was recorded. Both variables are statistically significant at 
the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. Also, the variable creditor rights shows that higher 
institutional development increases the likelihood of a banking crisis.  
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Most of the above findings contradict the theoretical expectations and earlier findings (Table 
2). Weak macroeconomic environment, including structural and regulatory deficiencies, was 
hypothesized to result in banking sector problems. However, the results may suggest that 
highly economically developed nations with low GDP growth might search higher earnings 
through financial reforms. This search of higher profits, while having low GDP growth, high 
creditor rights and high GDP per capita, would thus lead to a higher probability of a banking 
crisis. However, creditor rights are statistically significantly correlated to financial reforms 
and GDP per capita. Thus, any conclusion on each determinant‘s separate effect on the 
probability of a banking crisis might be difficult to make. 
Regarding the financial variable M2 to reserves, which measures the vulnerability to capital 
outflows, no significant results were found. Contrary to theoretical assumptions and the 
findings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), this variable shows negative coefficients 
across all model specifications. The regression would therefore imply capital outflow to 
decrease the likelihood of a banking crisis. This could suggest that the possibility of foreign 
capital outflow is a disciplinary device against banking crises. The variables measuring 
financial reforms, inflation and real interest rates were statistically insignificant and of 
comparably small impact. Any conclusions concerning their influence on the probability of a 
banking crisis are difficult to make. The variables inflation and real interest rates were both 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in the study by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998). However, their study only researches a small number of countries, banking crises and 
years. Finally, thanks to the different model specifications 1.11 to 1.13 and 2.11 to 2.14, 
automatic robustness checks were ensured and successful, as additional variables did not alter 
the original variables‘ coefficients. However, I found that earlier studies‘ results are not as 
strong as expected.  
Most importantly, the study of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) with a time frame of 
15 years showed, as mentioned, strong results which were turned around in this study. 
Especially, we showed that most variables are statistically significantly correlated to at least 
one other variable. This raised questions about the endogeneity of these variables and whether 
the true determinants of banking crises are yet found. Future research is advised to focus on 
developing better determinants of banking crises.  
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3.2 Empirical part II: Banking crises’ effects 
This second empirical part investigates how the origins of banking crises impact the crises‘ 
outcome. I argue that financial and structural variables as well as government intervention-, 
monetary- and fiscal policies might explain fiscal costs and economic output loss. These 
outcomes, defined as slowed growth and higher fiscal cost, are in ordinary least squares 
regressions regressed on crisis and pre-crisis variables. From the database by Laeven and 
Valencia (2008), I obtain the dataset on 42 banking crises for the period 1970 to 2007. 
Overall, the results show a strong impact of twin and triple crises, different institutional 
environments and government interventions on fiscal and economical cost. Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003) noted, only few studies have used cross-country empirical analysis to study 
most efficient crisis resolutions despite its importance to policymakers.  
While focusing on fiscal and economical cost of banking crises, I recognize that the most 
efficient crisis resolution is under dispute. Generally, a trade-off is faced between reducing 
fiscal costs, and reducing economic cost (output loss). Governments can reallocate taxpayers 
wealth towards banks and debtors to restart productive investment at the cost of misallocating 
capital and distorting incentive which potentially results in moral hazard.
6
 Crisis resolution 
policies are researched by Claessens et al. (2003), Hoelscher and Quintyn (2003) and 
Honohan and Laeven (2005). This literature confirms that assisting banks and their borrowers 
can be counterproductive
7
 as banks tend to take unproductive risks at governments‘ expenses. 
Furthermore, bailing out banks during times of regulatory capital forbearance
8
 results in 
higher tax costs, more severe credit supply contraction and economic decline (Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2002, Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003, Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 
2003). Additionally, liquidity support and government guarantees (explicit) on financial 
institutions are not necessarily recovery enhancing despite the fact that it is difficult to foresee 
the consequences hadn‘t such costly steps been taken (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003 and 
Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2003).  
In summary, crises costs appear in two forms and are dependent on each other. Fighting crises 
with government interventions will increase fiscal costs but is theoretically expected to lower 
output losses. Vice-versa, lower fiscal costs will increase output losses of the economy.  
                                                 
6
 As banks may feel encouraged to abuse government protections. 
7
 It can increase losses to banks. 
8
 This allows banks to avoid the cost of regulatory compliance. 
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The main focus of this research part II is therefore to research variables that explain crises 
outcomes; slowed growth and fiscal costs incurred. I hypothesize that the severity of output 
losses can be explained with the simultaneous occurring of a debt and or currency crisis, 
levels of public debt, current accounts and deposits to GDP and inflation. Also, a preceding 
credit boom may explain the strength of the output loss. Additionally, structural variables, 
such as the financial, institutional and economic development, government ownership in 
banks, explicit deposit insurance and the severity of the crisis are hypothesized to explain 
output losses. After describing the variables, hypotheses, data and methodology used, follows 
the section on the empirical results which will show that more government intervention 
results in higher fiscal cost as well as higher economical cost. 
 
Table 7. Determinants of banking crises costs 
This table describes the variables used in my OLS regression on the determinants of banking crises costs. Year t equals the 
year of the start of the banking crisis. If not specified otherwise, the variables were obtained from Laeven and Valencia 
(2008).  
Dependent 
Variables 
Explanation Expected 
correlation 
to 
FISCAL COST NET net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP during [t, t+5] 
O
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T
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OUTPUT LOSS difference of the real GDP and trend real GDP in 
percentage of the trend real GDP, for the period [t, 
t+3] 
 
Explanatory variables 
Initial conditions 
  
Dummy 
CURRENCY 
CRISIS 
equals 1 if a currency crisis (a nominal currency 
depreciation of minimum 30% which is also at least a 
10% increase in the rate of depreciation compared to 
the year before) occurred during the period [t-1, t+1] 
+ + 
Dummy DEBT 
CRISIS  
equals 1 if a sovereign debt crisis occurred during the 
period [t-1, t+1] 
+ + 
PUBLICDEBT/GDP general government gross debt to GDP in the pre-crisis 
year t-1 
+ + 
INFLATION percentage change of the GDP deflator in the pre-crisis 
year t-1 
+ + 
DEPOSITS/GDP total deposits taking institutions to GDP in the pre-
crisis year t-1 
+ + 
GOVERNMENT 
OWNED 
government owned share of the banking system assets 
in the pre-crisis year t-1 
+ + 
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Table 7 continued. Determinants of banking crises costs 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Explanation Expected 
correlation 
to 
  
O
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T
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S
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C
O
S
T
 
Financial system indicators   
Dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is based on French 
or Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal 
origins from La Porta et al. (2000)) 
+ + 
FINANCIAL 
LIBERALIZATION 
measures major financial liberalizations during [t-5, t] 
(index of financial liberalization (Abiad and Mody, 
2005)) 
+ + 
Crisis containment policy responses   
Dummy DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE 
equals 1 if the government introduced a deposit 
insurance or blanket guarantee during [t, t+3], 
- + 
Crisis Resolution Policies    
Dummy LARGE-
SCALE 
INTERVENTION 
equals 1 if the government intervened in banks 
through e.g. nationalizing, closures, mergers, sales and 
recapitalizations of large banks during [t, t+3] 
? + 
Dummy 
DEPOSITOR 
LOSSES 
equals 1 if depositors of failed banks incurred losses 
during [t, t+3], 
+ - 
   
Control variables    
CURRENT 
ACCOUNT/GDP 
total current accounts of private households, 
corporations and the government to the country‘s GDP 
in the pre-crisis year t-1 
- - 
CREDIT BOOM equals 1 if a country experienced a credit boom during 
[t-3, t-1]  
+ + 
Dummy MARKET equals 1 if the country has a market-based financial 
system in the pre-crisis year t-1 
+/- +/- 
Dummy 
DEVELOPED 
equals 1 if the country at time t belongs to the first half 
of countries in the world ranked according to their 
GDP per capita at time t 
+ + 
PEAK NPL peak ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans during 
[t, t+5] 
- - 
Dummy BANK 
RUN 
equals 1 if a country‘s banking system experienced a 
depositor run (minimum 5% drop in total outstanding 
deposits within one month during [t, t+1]) 
+ + 
MONETARY 
POLICY INDEX 
index of monetary policies during the years [t, t+3], 
either expansive (+1), contractive (-1), or neither (-0) 
? ? 
FISCAL POLICY 
INDEX 
index of fiscal policy stance indicating fiscal policies‘ 
expansion (+1), contraction (-1) or neither (0) during 
the years [t, t+3] 
- + 
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3.2.1 Determinants of banking crises’ costs and hypotheses 
On the basis of the literature review, I describe the chosen variables and hypothesize how 
these variables influence the cost of banking crisis. The variables are grouped into dependent 
variables and groups of explanatory variables; -initial conditions, -containment policies, -
resolution policies and -macroeconomic policies. Table 7 summarizes the variables and their 
expected relation to the cost of banking crises. 
3.2.1.1 Dependent Variable 
The variable FISCAL COST NET corresponds, exactly as in Laeven and Valencia (2008), to 
the net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP and is measured over the period [t, t+5] where t 
equals the starting year of the banking crisis.  
The variable OUTPUT LOSS measures, exactly as in Laeven and Valencia (2008), the 
difference between the actual real GDP and the trend real GDP expressed as a percentage of 
trend real GDP, for the period [t, t+3] where t is the starting year of the banking crisis. The 
trend real GDP is computed by using the trend real GDP growth up to the year preceding the 
crisis. Using this method could overstate losses if preceding the crisis a growth boom 
occurred. Also if the crisis is solely a correction of unsustainable economic developments, 
output losses need not be attributed to the banking crisis per se (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
3.2.1.2 Explanatory and control variables 
Initial conditions 
In all 42 identified crises occurred a systemic banking crisis. I define a systemic banking 
crisis, exactly as Laeven and Valencia (2008), as one where the country‘s corporate and 
financial sector experiences a large number of defaults and difficulties in timely repaying of 
contracts. Thus, non-performing loans increase sharply and most aggregate banking system 
capital is exhausted. Alongside depressed asset prices, sharp increases in real interest rates 
and slowed capital flow is often observable. Hence, each crisis event and starting date is 
cross-checked with whether the crisis coincides with deposit runs, deposit freezes, blanket 
guarantees, extensive liquidity support, large proportions of non-performing loans, exhausted 
capital flows or bank interventions.  
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I define, exactly as Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Frankel and Rose (1996), a ―currency 
crisis‖ as a nominal currency depreciation of minimum 30% which is also at least a 10% 
increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year before. In practice, the percentage 
change of period end official nominal bilateral dollar exchange rate from the World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database of the IMF was used. Therefore the Dummy CURRENCY CRISIS 
equals 1 if a currency crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], where t signifies the starting 
year of the banking crisis. A twin crisis is expected to have even more negative effects on 
output growth and fiscal cost. 
The Dummy DEBT CRISIS equals 1, exactly as in Laeven and Valencia (2008), if a 
sovereign debt crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], where t signifies the starting year 
of the banking crisis (following only referred to ―t‖ anymore). Also in this case, a twin or 
triple crisis is expected to have even more negative effects on output growth and fiscal cost. 
The data was obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2008) who in turn obtained data on 
―sovereign debt crises‖ by relying on information from Beim and Calomiris (2001), 
WorldBank (2002) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). 
Figure 2 reports the frequency of crises, namely banking, currency and sovereign debt crises 
and notes the occurrence of twin (banking and currency) and triple (banking, currency and 
debt) crises in each year between 1970 and 2007. A twin crises is defined as a banking crises 
in year t in combination with a currency crisis during the period [t-1, t+1], and in a triple crisis 
a sovereign debt crisis occurs in addition to the currency and banking crisis, during the period 
[t-1, t+1].  
The variable PUBLIC DEBT/GDP is the ratio of the general government gross debt to GDP 
for the pre-crisis year t-1. Fink et al. (2004) found strong relationships between public debt 
financing and the country‘s growth. They find that especially if foreign banks locally lend to 
developing governments, both parties face a mutual interest in an efficient, sound, regulated 
and stable financial sector. These findings oppose theoretical assumptions of Fink et al. 
(2004) who expect a high level of public debt to GDP to weaken the macroeconomic 
environment. Thus, I hypothesize that a higher ratio of public debt to GDP increases the 
severity of the crisis as governments are facing financial constraints during their crisis 
intervention. INFLATION is the percentage change of the GDP deflator during the pre-crisis 
year t-1 which is hypothesized to explain the severity of the crisis in case of a boom in asset 
growth and prices preceding the start of the banking crisis (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
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1997). I expect high inflation to increase the severity of a crisis as high booms are expected to 
be followed by strong busts. The variable DEPOSITS/GDP measures the ratio of total 
deposits taking institutions to GDP for the pre-crisis year t-1, which is a measure of economic 
activity and a stock indicator of deposit resources available to the financial sector for the 
sector‘s lending activities. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2009) found that the ratio varies 
positively with the income level of countries. The global median was 27% in 1980 and rose to 
51% in 2007. However, it can also signify a vulnerability to balance-of-payment crisis 
because a higher deposits to GDP value is hypothesized to increase the severity of the crisis 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997).  
The variable GOVERNMENT OWNED measures the share of the banking system assets that 
are government owned in year t-1. A high government owned share of the banking system is 
hypothesized to increase the banking crisis‘ costs because governments are found to be 
inefficient and bureaucratic, burdensome owners (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). On 
the other hand, a high share of government owned bank assets might decrease the likelihood 
of moral hazard between financial institutions and government as the government is itself the 
owner. In countries with corrupt officials I expect this ratio to negatively affect the crisis as 
officials want other (foreign) financial intermediaries to give up positions. LLSV (2002) as 
well as Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) found greater state ownership in banking to be 
associated with reduced competition and poorer productivity. Also, Caprio and Martinez-
Peria (2000) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) show that greater state ownership is 
associated with higher likelihood of banking crises.  
H3.11 A parallel currency crisis, a parallel debt crisis, high public debt to GDP, high 
inflation, high deposits to GDP and a high share of government owned assets 
increase output losses. 
H4.11 A parallel currency crisis, a parallel debt crisis, high public debt to GDP, high 
inflation, high deposits to GDP and a high share of government owned assets 
increase fiscal costs. 
Financial systems 
The law and finance view exists since La Porta et al. (2000) rejected the entire bank vs. 
market based view debate about the primary determinant of the effectiveness of the financial 
system in facilitating growth and mitigating banking crises. Instead, La Porta et al. (2000) 
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stated that legal systems are the primary determinant of the effectiveness of the financial 
system. Therefore, I also introduce the Dummy FS LAW which equals 1 if the countries legal 
origins are based on either French or Socialist law in contrast to British, German or 
Scandinavian law. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) provide the dataset 
on legal origins. They find French and Socialist legal origins to affect GDP most negatively. 
Exactly as Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache(1998), I hypothesize therefore that countries with 
French or Socialist legal origins will experience higher output losses and fiscal costs 
following a banking crisis. Furthermore, the variable FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION is 
measured by using an index of financial liberalization from Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel 
(2008) which is hypothesized to proxy for higher likelihood of financial innovations and a 
riskier financial system that increased the likelihood of growth but also of financial crises 
(Wilmarth, 2003). This variable equals 1 if during [t-5, t] a major financial liberalization took 
place, as recorded by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008). Wilmarth (2003) noted that 
financial liberalization encourages banks to increase their lending commitment and equity 
investments in the real estate and securities markets. Rapid growth of credit and investment 
results in an economic ―boom‖, fuelling asset prices and the willingness of financial 
intermediaries to provide financing. This ―boom‖ loses its relation to ―fundamentals‖ which, 
after investors realize the divergence, ends in a strong ―bust‖ due to rapid liquidation of 
investments and loans. This ―bust‖ often gives rise to a systemic banking crisis and thereafter 
high output losses (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Therefore, I hypothesize that 
financial liberalization increase the output loss and fiscal cost of banking crises. 
H3.12 Countries with French or Socialist legal origins and financially liberalizing 
reforms will experience higher output losses.  
H4.12 Countries with French or Socialist legal origins and financially liberalizing 
reforms will experience higher fiscal costs. 
Crisis containment policy responses 
Governments‘ crisis containment and resolution responses are hypothesized to also influence 
crises‘ costs. In the containment phase the crisis is ongoing and governments aim to restore 
public confidence whereas the resolution phase signifies the actual financial restructuring of 
financial institutions and corporations (Honohan and Laeven, 2005, Hoelscher and Quintyn, 
2003).  
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At the beginning of a crisis, government‘s policy options are limited to existing institutions 
and simple new mechanisms such as a) suspension of convertibility of deposits
9
 b) regulatory 
capital forbearance
10
 c) emergency liquidity support to banks or d) a government guarantee to 
depositors (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). These intervention policies are designed to mitigate 
financial distress of borrowers and banks which may arise through high capital requirements, 
loan defaults and bank runs due to diminished market and intermediaries‘ confidence or wider 
macro-economic pressures including exchange rate pressures. Arising bank runs can be 
addressed for example with a bank holiday. The success of the intervention depends on the 
credibility and creditworthiness of the government. Preventing an insolvent or near to 
insolvent bank from defaulting may require the government to intervene administratively 
(overtake management power) or close down the bank and e.g. transfer bank‘s assets and 
liabilities to a sound bank. Finally, government intervention is most critical under wider 
macroeconomic and financial turbulences during which banks are victims of external factors. 
Regulatory forbearance on capital and liquid reserve requirements can be appropriate and 
necessary in such an environment (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Every government policy 
response impacts the ultimate allocation of losses in the system and possible moral hazard 
considerations. In general, it can be said that central banks usually privilege stability over 
cost, meaning governments rather too liberally extend loans of ―bankrupt banks‖ instead of 
taking the risk of even larger costs of contagion and a worsening financial crisis (Lindgren, 
2003). Therefore, the Dummy deposit insurance was introduced, which equals 1, exactly as in 
Laeven and Valencia (2008), if the government introduced a deposit insurance or blanket 
guarantee on bank deposits. This dummy is hypothesized to negatively affect the crisis‘ 
financial cost as this might lead to moral hazard of excessive risk taking by banks (Kane, 
1989). This higher fiscal cost is, on the other hand, hypothesized to restore confidence into the 
banking sector and therefore increases economical output.  
H3.13 The presence of a deposit insurance decreases output losses. 
H4.13 The presence of a deposit insurance increases fiscal costs. 
                                                 
9
 This prevents bank depositors from seeking repayment from banks. 
10
 This allows banks to avoid the cost of regulatory compliance (e.g. banks are allowed to overstate their equity 
capital to avoid the cost of a crunch in credit supply). 
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Crisis Resolution Policies  
Governments‘ solutions towards long-run challenges of crises are usually built around 
focusing on resuming normally functioning credit and legal systems and the rebuilding of 
banks and borrower‘s balance sheets. Possible government ownership or regulatory 
administration of banks has to be transferred back into solvent private entities‘ hands. 
Therefore, the financial and organizational restructuring of firms and intermediaries is one of 
the most important tasks during the crisis resolution period. Due to coordination problems and 
lack of capital, these functions are mostly performed by governments. However, governments 
always face a trade-off between enlarged fiscal cost with an accelerated economic recovery or 
lower fiscal costs, resulting in slower economic recovery. Whether to forgive some debt and 
restructure banks or move assets to a new entity with new management, are critical questions. 
Overall, policy responses mostly depend on the crisis‘ sources. Thus, a general rule on how to 
approach such restructuring challenges is almost impossible.  
The main policy responses during the resolution phase can be stated as a) conditional 
government-subsidized, but decentralized, workouts of distressed loans, b) debt forgiveness, 
c) establishment of a government-owned asset management company to buy and resolve 
distressed loans, d) government-assisted sales of financial institutions, and e) government-
assisted recapitalization of financial institutions through injection of funds (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008). Discretionary schemes of debt relief b) can lead to potential moral hazard as 
debtors might stop trying to repay debts in order to get into the list of beneficiaries of b). On 
the other hand, debt relief through inflation or currency depreciation is seen as inducing lower 
potential hazard. Alternatively, an insolvent bank‘s bad loan portfolio can be carved-out, 
organizationally restructured under new ownership and management and thereafter gradually 
sold back into the market. However such a government run asset management company‘s 
success depends mostly on portfolio‘s assets where real estate assets are more beneficial than 
politically-connected loans (Klingebiel, 2000). Typically, countries apply a combination of 
resolution strategies including government-managed and market-based mechanisms 
(Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2003). The success of both depends on efficient and 
effective legal, regulatory, supervisory and political institutions in which possible moral 
hazard implications were taken into account. Thus it is difficult to predict the effect of 
interventions on output losses. On the other hand, it is easier to show the effect on fiscal costs.  
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The Dummy LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION equals 1, exactly as in Laeven and Valencia 
(2008), if the government intervened in banks through e.g. nationalizing, closures, mergers, 
sales and recapitalizations of large banks during [t, t+3]. This dummy is hypothesized to be 
positively related to fiscal costs but any relation to output losses is unclear.  
Furthermore, the dummy DEPOSITOR LOSSES equals 1, exactly as in Laeven and Valencia 
(2008), if depositors of failed banks incurred losses. I expect that depositor losses weaken the 
confidence into the economy and thus result in higher output losses. On the other hand, higher 
depositor losses could mean that the government loaded the cost of this crisis onto the 
depositor and thus should face lower fiscal costs. 
H3.14 Large-scale interventions influence output losses and depositor losses increase 
output losses. 
H4.14 Large-scale interventions increase the fiscal costs and depositor losses decrease 
the fiscal cost. 
Control variables 
The variable CURRENT ACCOUNT/GDP equals the ratio of total current accounts of private 
households, corporations and the government in relation to the country‘s GDP in year t-1. I 
expect a current account deficit to negatively influence the severity of the crisis. The dummy 
CREDIT BOOM equals 1 if a country experienced a credit boom before the crisis. A credit 
boom is defined as three-year pre-crisis average growth in private credit to GDP in excess of 
10 percent per annum. A credit boom is often connected to opening up credit to a new and 
mostly subprime class of lenders, thus granting unsustainable credits is hypothesized to lead 
to higher probabilities of default and a severe banking crisis outcomes (Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998).  
The Dummy MARKET equals 1 if the country has at time t-1 a market-based financial 
system in contrary to a bank-based system. An yearly index about countries‘ financial 
structure based on the measurement ratio Stock Market Capitalization to Total Deposits is 
constructed. Countries belonging to the half above the sample median are identified as 
market-based countries. I expect a market based country to decrease the negative effects of a 
banking crisis better. 
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The Dummy DEVELOPED equals 1 if the country‘s GDP per capita at time t is above the 
sample median (measured exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Various 
studies found that financial crises in developed countries are more rare but also more severe 
once a crisis has started. Therefore I expect this dummy to increase crisis‘ cost. 
The variable PEAK NPL signifies the peak ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (in 
percent) during the years [t, t+5]. This is a measure for the cut in the supply of financial 
intermediation as banks faced lower stocks of available credit supply due to high percentages 
of nonperforming loans. Furthermore, banks are more risk averse than normally and might not 
be able to separate good from bad projects. Hence credit supply is left-ward shifted and 
positive NPV growth projects and investments won‘t be undertaken which again suppresses 
the output growth.  
The dummy BANK RUN equals 1 if a country‘s banking system experienced a depositor run, 
defined as a minimum 5% drop in total outstanding deposits within one month during the 
period [t, t+1], exactly as in Laeven and Valencia (2008). I hypothesize that a bank run 
undermines consumers‘ and lenders‘ confidence, thus negatively affecting the crisis‘ 
outcome. 
In order to manage banking crises and reduce their impact on the real economy, governments 
tend to change macroeconomic policies. However, such policy changes are usually difficult to 
observe. Laeven and Valencia (2008) introduced two indices focusing on macroeconomic 
policy changes. They divide between the monetary policy index and the fiscal policy index; 
the former is an index of monetary policies during years t, t+3 and is either expansive (+1), 
contractive (-1), or neither (-0). Laeven and Valencia (2008) derived this index by observing 
the average percentage change in reserve money during the years t, t+3 compared to the pre-
crisis years [t-4, t-1]. Expansive refers to a change in [t, t+3] of 1 to 5%, contractive to a 
change of -1 to -5%-. There is no clear consensus on the effects of monetary policy 
influencing crisis outcomes (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
The variable FISCAL POLICY INDEX is an index of the government‘s fiscal policy stance 
and indicates fiscal policies‘ expansion (+1), contraction (-1) or neither (0) during years [t, 
t+3]. An expansive fiscal policy is defined as an average fiscal balance during [t, t+3] of less 
than -1.5% of GDP whereas contractive refers to an average fiscal balance of more than 1.5% 
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of GDP. An expansive fiscal balance, thus more fiscal spending, is expected to be positively 
related to fiscal costs but negatively to output losses. 
3.2.2 Methodology: Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
In order to study the hypotheses in this event-study, an ordinary least squares regression 
methodology will be applied exactly as in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), and 
Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2003).  
Dougherty (2002) states that the ordinary least squares regression assumes the dependent 
variable Y to depend on k-1 explanatory variables             according to a true but 
unknown relationship 
                                 
Given a set of n observations on Y,             the OLS method is used to fit the equation 
                        
This is done by minimizing the sum of squares of the residuals of           . The residual 
is define as               The regression coefficients,           , provide an estimate of 
the impact of explanatory variables,             on the dependent variable, Y. 
To evaluate the joint explanatory power of the independent variables included in the 
regression, I report   . This coefficient of determination is a statistical measure of how well 
the regression line approximates the real data points. The theoretical minimum of    is 0. An 
   of 1.0 indicates that the regression line fits perfectly the data. In addition to    I report the 
P-Values, a measure of goodness of fit based on the null hypothesis        .  
I re-scale calendar times into crisis-centred time for each country. Country-specific effects are 
diminished by demeaning each appropriate observation with the corresponding country 
average. I focus my analysis in most variables on the duration of three to one year before the 
crisis and three to five year from the start of the systemic banking crises onwards.  
In order to assess the robustness of the findings, I divide the sample into developing and 
developed countries, market-based and bank-based countries, French/ Socialist Law Origin 
Countries and Other Law Origin Countries, financial liberalized and not liberalized countries 
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and government ownership in bank countries and no government ownership in banks 
countries.  
3.2.3 Data 
From Laeven and Valencia (2008) I obtained a database that consists of 124 systemic banking 
crises in 62 countries during the period from 1970 to 2007. The dataset also provides data on 
208 currency crises as well as 63 episodes of sovereign debt crises.  
Figure 2 shows that banking crises were most frequent during the early 1990‘s as well as 
currency crises were also common during the first-half of the 1990‘s. The early 1980‘s also 
recorded a high number of currency crises, with a peak in 1981 with 45 episodes. Sovereign 
debt crises were also relatively common during the early 1980‘s, with a peak of 10 debt crises 
in 1983. In total, I count 124 banking crises of which 42 are considered twin crises and 10 can 
be classified as triple crises (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure II Frequency of financial crises 
Figure 2 reports 124 banking crises, 208 currency crises and 63 sovereign debt crises over the period of 1970 to 2007 from 
around the world. Out of the 124 banking crises, 42 occurred as twin and 10 as triple crises. Figure 2 reveals that banking 
crises were most frequent during the 1990‘s with a maximum of 13 systemic banking crises starting in the year 1995. 
Currency crisis peaked in 1981 with 45 crises and 10 debt crises in 1983. 
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For the empirical part II the complete data was obtained from the database of Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) who drew upon information sources such as IMF staff reports, World Bank 
documents, working papers from central bank staff and academics. However, I also cross-
check on the information provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008) through information 
gathering in Datastream, IMF, IFS, BIS, FIBV, and the world economic outlook (WEO). 
Addititonally, data on the legal origin and financial reforms of countries are obtained from 
LLSV (2000) and Abiad and Mody (2005). After leaving out all banking crises with missing 
explanatory variables, I am left with 42 banking crises as my core data. Exactly as Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002) already noted, also this sample is small and is based only on 
relatively few data points. In addition, every crisis might be different from previous ones. 
Thus, coefficients derived from in-sample estimation are of limited use out-of-sample. 
Descriptive statistics of banking crises‘ costs 
Table 8 gives a descriptive overview on the variables‘ means, standard deviation, standard 
error, t-value, confidence intervals, median, minimum, maximum, and their correlation to 
output loss and fiscal cost. Fiscal cost, net of recoveries, is on average 13.3% of the GDP but 
can increase up to as much as 55% of GDP in the case of Argentina in 1980. Output losses, 
measured as deviation from trend GDP, are large with a sample average of 20% of GDP 
during the first four years of the crisis. The banking crises in Brazil and Bolivia in 1994, don‘t 
show any output losses whereas Thailand in 1997 reached almost 98% output loss of GDP. 
Additionally, it is theoretical expected that fiscal cost and output loss are negatively correlated 
to each other, as the crisis can be paid either through financial cost or larger output losses. 
However, higher output losses will also yield larger tax revenue losses. Therefore, both 
variables, if enough strong, would move into the same direction. Table 9 reports that output 
loss and fiscal cost are in the Pearson Correlation positively and statistically significantly (at 
the two-tailed 5% level) correlated. However, these two variables might be endogenous 
because I expect a feedback function to exist between these two variables. For example higher 
output loss results in lower tax income and thus a higher fiscal cost. Therefore, any relation 
must be carefully interpreted, as suggested already by Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics of banking crises’ initial conditions 
This table describes empirical study II on the determinants of banking crises costs variables‘ statistical values. FISCAL 
COST NET equals the net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP during [t, t+5], OUTPUT LOSS equals the difference of the 
real GDP and trend real GDP in percentage of the trend real GDP for the period [t, t+3], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS 
equals 1 if a currency crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], the dummy DEBT CRISIS equals 1 if a sovereign debt 
crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], PUBLICDEBT/GDP equals the general government gross debt to GDP in the 
pre-crisis year t-1, INFLATION equals the percentage change of the GDP deflator in the pre-crisis year t-1, 
DEPOSITS/GDP equals the total deposits taking institutions to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, GOVERNMENT OWNED 
corresponds to the government owned share of the banking system assets in the pre-crisis year t-1, the dummy FS LAW 
equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is based on French or Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La 
Porta et al. (2000)), FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION measures major financial liberalizations during [t-5, t] through an 
index of financial liberalization (Abiad and Mody, 2005), the dummy DEPOSIT INSURANCE equals 1 if the government 
introduced a deposit insurance or blanket guarantee during [t, t+3], the dummy LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION equals 
1 if the government intervened in banks during [t, t+3], the dummy DEPOSITOR LOSSES equals 1 if depositors of failed 
banks incurred losses during [t, t+3], CURRENT ACCOUNT/GDP equals the total current accounts of private households, 
corporations and the government to the country‘s GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, CREDIT BOOM equals 1 if a country 
experienced a credit boom during [t-3, t-1], the dummy MARKET equals 1 if the country has a market-based financial 
system in the pre-crisis year t-1, the dummy DEVELOPED equals 1 if the country at time t belongs to the first half of 
countries ranked according to their GDP per capita at time t, PEAK NPL equals the peak ratio of nonperforming loans to 
total loans during [t, t+5], the dummy BANK RUN equals 1 if a country‘s banking system experienced a depositor run 
during [t, t+1], MONETARY POLICY INDEX equals an index of monetary policies during [t, t+3], FISCAL POLICY 
INDEX equals an index of fiscal policy stance during [t, t+3]. The data was obtained, if not specified otherwise, from 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) and looks at the time range of 1970 to 2007. ―t‖ equals the starting year of the banking crisis. 
  Mean Variance 
t-
distri- 
bution 
95% confidence 
interval  
Median 
Correlation 
to 
OUTPUT 
LOSS  
Correlation 
to FISCAL 
COST NET Lower Upper 
Dependent variables 
        
FISCALCOSTNET 0.13 0.02 6.18 0.09 0.17 0.1 0.34 1 
OUTPUTLOSS 0.21 0.07 4.71 0.12 0.29 0.11 1 0.34 
 
Explanatory variables 
        
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.55 0.25 7.05 0.39 0.71 1 0.32 0.28 
DEBTCRISIS 0.12 0.11 2.35 0.02 0.22 0 -0.11 -0.04 
PUBLICDEBTGDP 0.46 0.16 6.75 0.32 0.6 0.3 -0.33 -0.06 
INFLATION 1.37 23.64 1.81 -0.16 2.91 0.11 -0.16 -0.12 
DEPOSITSGDP 0.49 0.21 7 0.35 0.63 0.36 0.13 -0.03 
GOVOWNED 0.31 0.06 8.19 0.23 0.39 0.28 -0.14 0 
FSLAW 0.71 0.21 10.12 0.57 0.86 1 -0.36 -0.04 
FINLIBERAL 48.03 751.2 11.36 39.49 56.57 53 0.19 0.04 
DEPOSITINSURANCE 0.29 0.21 4.05 0.14 0.43 0 0.4 0.42 
INTERVENTION 0.86 0.13 15.68 0.75 0.97 1 0.18 0.2 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES 0.33 0.23 4.53 0.19 0.48 0 0.08 -0.14 
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Table 8 continued. Descriptive statistics of banking crises’ initial conditions 
  Mean Variance 
t-
distri- 
bution 
95% 
confidence 
interval  
Median 
Correlation 
to 
OUTPUT 
LOSS  
Correlation 
to FISCAL 
COST 
NET Lower Upper 
Control variables 
        
CURACCOUNTGDP -0.04 0 -5.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 
CREDITBOOM 0.24 0.19 3.58 0.1 0.37 0 0.09 0.15 
MARKET 0.31 0.22 4.29 0.16 0.46 0 0.18 0.13 
DEVELOPED 0.83 0.14 14.32 0.72 0.95 1 0.1 0.04 
PEAKNPL 0.25 0.02 10.26 0.2 0.3 0.22 0.05 0.1 
BANKRUN 0.62 0.24 8.16 0.47 0.77 1 -0.02 -0.15 
MONETARYPOLICY 1.68 20.8 2.18 0.12 3.25 0.22 -0.16 -0.14 
FISCALPOLICY -0.04 0 -7.64 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.19 -0.3 
 
 
Initial and financial system conditions 
Table 8 reveals that banking crises tend to coincide with currency crisis (in 55% of the cases) 
more often than with sovereign debt crises (in only 7% of the cases). Macroeconomic 
conditions are often weak prior to banking crisis and fiscal balances are mostly negative, 
2.1% minus on average. Inflation runs high at 137% at the start of the crisis (Table 8).  
LLSV (1997) found that government ownership in banks often leads to a higher likelihood of 
banking crisis. As expected, governments owned also in this sample about 31% of banking 
assets on average. Additionally, 30% of the countries experienced severe credit booms 
preceding the crisis. These credit booms in turn often appear to be coupled to earlier financial 
liberalization such as the ones before the Nordic crisis in the 90‘s (Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 
1998). Countries experiencing credit crises often suffer from weak legal institutions that are 
based on a French or Socialist law origin or fundament. Indeed, in 71% of the countries 
experiencing a banking crisis, French or Socialist law was the law origin (Table 8). Finally, an 
average of 48 points in the index of financial liberalization (Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel, 
2008) was recorded preceding banking crises. This might imply a high financial reform 
activity preceding banking crises. 
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Crisis variables 
Deposit insurances were issued during the crisis containment phase in 50% of the cases 
whereas in 86% followed a large-scale government intervention in banks, such as bank 
closures, nationalizations, or assisted mergers. Thus, only a few banking crisis managed to be 
overcome without large-scale government intervention. In the case of Argentina during the 
1995 crisis for example, only 0.6% of the financial systems assets, five actual banks, were 
liquidated.  
Control variables 
Current accounts show an average deficit of -3.9% and nonperforming loan rates vary 
substantially and often depend on how connected loans are across banks. Furthermore, bank 
runs are a common feature of banking crises; in 62% of the cases sharp reductions in total 
deposits were observed (up to 26% in one month). 
The theory of benefits of multiple avenues of financial intermediation suggests that capital 
markets besides banks can smoothen out any imbalances in the banking sector. Also in the 
sample only 30% of the banking crises took place in market-oriented financial systems. This 
finding is in line with the results in our first empirical study which show that capital market 
based financial systems have fewer but stronger banking crises. 
Fiscal policies are on average expansive, possibly to support the financial and real sectors and 
to host bank and debt restructuring programs. At the same time, also monetary policies are 
expansive. This shows that central banks increase their reserve money, possibly to signal to 
the international financial community a commitment to increase the macroeconomic stability. 
Correlations 
Table 9 shows that only the variables measuring monetary policies and inflation are 
statistically significantly correlated at the 1 percent level (2-tailed). This implies that any later 
findings in which both variables are included have to be treated with care as I might not be 
able to separate banking crises effects of these two variables or any effect of an exogenous 
unidentified variable on both of them.  
 
 
 Table 9. Correlation matrix of banking crises’ effects 
This table presents cross sectional Pearson correlations for regression variables of the second empirical study on the determinants of banking crises costs. The sample period is from 1970 to 2007. ** 
indicate that the variables are statistically significantly correlated at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Find a description of the variables in Table 7. 
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FISCALCOSTNET 1                                       
OUTPUTLOSS 0.34 1                                     
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.3 0.3 1                                   
DEBTCRISIS -0 -0 0.2 1                                 
PUBLICDEBTGDP -0 -0 -0 0.2 1                               
INFLATION -0 -0 0.2 -0 -0 1                             
DEPOSITSGDP -0 0.1 -0 -0 0.1 0.31 1                           
CURACCOUNTGDP -0 -0 0.3 0.1 -0.41 0.2 0.2 1                         
CREDITBOOM 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.1 1                       
GOVOWNED 0 -0 0 0 -0 0.1 -0.32 0.31 -0 1                     
MARKET 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0 -0 0.30 0.2 0.1 -0 -0.31 1                   
FSLAW -0 -0.35 0.1 0.1 -0 0.2 -0.38 -0 0.2 0.2 -0 1                 
DEVELOPED 0 0.1 0.2 -0 -0.43 0.1 0.2 0.30 -0 -0 0.3 -0 1               
FINLIBERAL 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0 -0 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0 0.2 -0 0.36 1             
PEAKNPL 0.1 0.1 0.32 0.1 0.2 -0 -0 0.1 -0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 0 1           
BANKRUN -0 -0 0.3 0.1 -0 0.2 -0 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0 0.3 0 -0 0 1         
DEPOSITINSURANCE 0.4 0.4 0.3 -0 0.2 -0 0.3 -0 -0 -0 0.3 -0 0 0.3 0.1 -0 1       
INTERVENTION 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.1 -0.31 0 -0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 1     
DEPOSITORSLOSSES -0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0 0.1 -0 -0 0.1 -0 -0 0.33 -0 -0 0.2 0.2 -0 0.1 1   
MONETARYPOLICY -0 -0 0.3 -0 0 
**0.6
8 0.2 0.2 -0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.40 -0 0.3 -0 -0.73 0.2 1 
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Table 10. Banking Crises Effects’ Regression Results for output loss and each variable 
separately 
This table shows the results from the OLS regressions on banking crises effects. The dependent variable, OUTPUT LOSS, 
was regressed on each explanatory variable separately. The sample consists of 42 banking crises. Constant and beta-
coefficient refer to the regressions‘ constant and coefficient, respectively. I also indicated the F-value, error term and P-
value. Variables‘ descriptions are found in Table 7. * /** /*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level. 
  Regressed on OUTPUT LOSS 
Variables 
Con- 
stant 
Beta - 
coefficient 
Error 
term F-value 
P-Value 
Regression 
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.096 0.169 0.317 3.789 *0.059 
DEBTCRISIS 0.216 -0.082 0.111 0.423 0.520 
PUBLICDEBTGDP 0.299 -0.204 0.330 3.186 *0.086 
INFLATION 0.216 -0.008 0.155 0.834 0.367 
DEPOSITSGDP 0.171 0.072 0.127 0.555 0.461 
GOVOWNED 0.254 -0.152 0.144 0.723 0.401 
FSLAW 0.353 -0.206 0.358 5.013 **0.032 
FINLIBERAL 0.109 0.002 0.191 1.284 0.265 
DEPOSITINSURANCE 0.132 0.217 0.398 6.408 **0.016 
INTERVENTION 0.075 0.146 0.178 1.114 0.299 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES 0.191 0.045 0.081 0.223 0.640 
 
 
Table 11. Banking Crises Effects’ Regression Results for fiscal cost and each variable 
separately 
This table shows the results from the OLS regressions on banking crises effects. The dependent variable, FISCAL COST, 
was regressed on each explanatory variable separately. The sample consists of 42 banking crises. Constant and beta-
coefficient refer to the regressions‘ constant and coefficient, respectively. I also indicated the F-value, error term and P-
value. Variables‘ descriptions are found in Table 7. * /** /*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level. 
  Regressed on FISCAL COST 
Variables 
Constant 
Beta - 
coefficient 
Error 
term F-value 
P-Value 
Regression 
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.087 0.075 0.28 3.239 *0.080 
DEBTCRISIS 0.132 -0.017 0.043 0.07 0.792 
PUBLICDEBTGDP 0.148 -0.21 0.058 0.097 0.758 
INFLATION 0.138 -0.003 0.124 0.574 0.453 
DEPOSITSGDP 0.134 -0.009 0.03 0.034 0.855 
GOVOWNED 0.13 0 0.001 0 0.996 
FSLAW 0.139 -0.011 0.038 0.054 0.818 
FINLIBERAL 0.121 0 0.038 0.055 0.816 
DEPOSITINSURANCE 0.094 0.120 0.417 8.020 **0.007 
INTERVENTION 0.053 0.086 0.196 1.511 0.227 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES 0.144 -0.038 0.139 0.753 0.391 
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3.2.4 Empirical findings of determinants of banking crises’ costs 
This section reports the results of regressing output loss and fiscal costs on each variable 
separately, as shown in Table 10 and 11. A parallel currency crisis and public debt to GDP 
are statistically significantly explaining output loss at the 10% level. Furthermore, French and 
Socialist law origins are statistically significantly explaining output loss at the 5% level. A 
twin crisis, banking and currency crisis, was hypothesized to increase output losses. Table 10 
proves that a parallel currency crisis negatively affects output loss. public debt to GDP is 
negatively affecting output loss, contrary to the expectations. However, public debt to GDP is 
negatively correlated to large-scale government interventions (Table 9). Therefore, public 
debt to GDP could serve as a disciplining device against fiscal spending and lowers economic 
losses. Explicit deposit insurances also statistically significantly increas output loss at the 5% 
level which shows that deposit insurance does not lead to significant mitigation but rather 
might increase moral hazard of banks in taking too large risks. Finally, French and Socialist 
legal origin countries are negatively related to output loss, suggesting that in countries with 
French or Socialist law origins output loss is lower.  
A parallel currency crisis increases fiscal costs, as was expected. Also, an explicit deposit 
insurance introduction significantly increases fiscal costs at the 5% significant level.  
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Table 12. Banking Crises Effects’ Regression Results for Output Loss 
This table shows the results from the OLS regressions (Hypotheses 3.11 to 3.14) on banking crises effects, by regressing 
OUTPUT LOSS on a set of explanatory as well as control variables. OUTPUT LOSS equals the difference of the real GDP 
and trend real GDP in percentage of the trend real GDP for the period [t, t+3], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS equals 1 if a 
currency crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], the dummy DEBT CRISIS equals 1 if a sovereign debt crisis occurred 
during the period [t-1, t+1], PUBLICDEBT/GDP equals the general government gross debt to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, 
INFLATION equals the percentage change of the GDP deflator in the pre-crisis year t-1, DEPOSITS/GDP equals the total 
deposits taking institutions to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, GOVERNMENT OWNED corresponds to the government 
owned share of the banking system assets in the pre-crisis year t-1, the dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is 
based on French or Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La Porta et al. (2000)), FINANCIAL 
LIBERALIZATION measures major financial liberalizations during [t-5, t] through an index of financial liberalization (Abiad 
and Mody, 2005), the dummy DEPOSIT INSURANCE equals 1 if the government introduced a deposit insurance or blanket 
guarantee during [t, t+3], the dummy LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION equals 1 if the government intervened in banks 
during [t, t+3], and the dummy DEPOSITOR LOSSES equals 1 if depositors of failed banks incurred losses during [t, t+3]. 
The data was obtained, if not specified otherwise, from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and looks at the time range of 1970 to 
2007. ―t‖ equals the starting year of the banking crisis. The sample consists of 42 banking crises. P-Values are in brackets. * 
/** /*** denotes statistical significance on the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: OUTPUT LOSS 
Explanatory variables 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 
(Constant) 0.093 (0.609) 0.273 * (0.079) 0.152 ** (0.010) 0.064 (0.630) 
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.177 * (0.0908)       
DEBTCRISIS -0.03642 (0.792)       
PUBLICDEBTGDP -0.3185 ** (0.032)       
INFLATION -0.019 ** (0.0342)       
DEPOSITSGDP 0.214 * (0.0813)       
GOVOWNED 0.109 (0.651)       
FSLAW   -0.183 * (0.071)     
FINLIBERAL   -0.0009 (0.605)     
DEPOSITINSURANCE     0.20 ** (0.014)   
INTERVENTION       0.143 (0.671) 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES       0.041 (0.671) 
 R Square 0.466 0.156 0.14 0.037 
F 2.074 1.429 6.001 0.636 
P-Value 0.092 * 0.248 0.013 ** 0.536 
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Table 13. Banking Crises Effects’ Robustness Test Regression Results for Output Loss 
This table shows the results from the OLS regressions on banking crises effects, by regressing OUTPUT LOSS on a set of 
explanatory as well as control variables. OUTPUT LOSS equals the difference of the real GDP and trend real GDP in 
percentage of the trend real GDP for the period [t, t+3], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS equals 1 if a currency crisis 
occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], the dummy DEBT CRISIS equals 1 if a sovereign debt crisis occurred during the period 
[t-1, t+1], PUBLICDEBT/GDP equals the general government gross debt to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, INFLATION 
equals the percentage change of the GDP deflator in the pre-crisis year t-1, DEPOSITS/GDP equals the total deposits taking 
institutions to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, GOVERNMENT OWNED corresponds to the government owned share of the 
banking system assets in the pre-crisis year t-1, the dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is based on French or 
Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La Porta et al. (2000)), FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
measures major financial liberalizations during [t-5, t] through an index of financial liberalization (Abiad and Mody, 2005), the 
dummy DEPOSIT INSURANCE equals 1 if the government introduced a deposit insurance or blanket guarantee during [t, 
t+3], the dummy LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION equals 1 if the government intervened in banks during [t, t+3], and the 
dummy DEPOSITOR LOSSES equals 1 if depositors of failed banks incurred losses during [t, t+3]. The data was obtained, if 
not specified otherwise, from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and looks at the time range of 1970 to 2007. ―t‖ equals the starting 
year of the banking crisis. The sample consists of 42 banking crises. P-Values are in brackets. * /** /*** denotes statistical 
significance on the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable: OUTPUT LOSS 
Explanatory variables 3.15 3.16 3.17 
(Constant) 0.300 (0.25) 0.03 (0.811) 3.1667 (0.352) 
FISCALCOSTNET   0.411 (0.222) 0.64 (0.301) 
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.301 ** (0.041)   0.282 (0.348) 
DEBTCRISIS -0.102 (0.537)   -0.228 (0.452) 
PUBLICDEBTGDP -0.26 (0.147)   -0.200 (0.614) 
INFLATION -0.004 (0.698)   0.044 (0.520) 
DEPOSITSGDP 0.054 (0.698)   0.122 (0.593) 
GOVOWNED 0.150 (0.601)   0.544 (0.265) 
FSLAW -0.326 ** (0.026)   -0.283 (0.131) 
FINLIBERAL 0.003 (0.343)   0.0004 (0.936) 
DEPOSITINSURANCE   0.186 * (0.064) 0.112 (0.551) 
INTERVENTION   0.029 (0.831) -3.127 (0.353) 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES   0.093 (0.311) 0.289 (0.214) 
 
R Square 0.684 0.23 0.886 
F 1.851 2.316 1.557 
P-Value 0.146 0.079 * 0.361 
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3.2.4.1 Determinants of output loss (Hypotheses 3.11 to 3.14) 
Table 12 reports the results of hypotheses 3.11 to 3.14 in which I regressed output loss on a 
set of explanatory variables with the basic expectation that banking crises adversely affect 
economic growth (Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; 
Eichengreen and Rose, 1998). In order to robustness test the hypotheses 3.11 to 3.14, I 
combined these hypotheses in various forms in 3.15 to 3.17.  
Hypothesis 3.11 looks at initial economic conditions in the pre-crisis years and on how they 
affected the output loss. A currency crisis increases the output loss statistically significantly. 
Robustness testing this variable proofed the variable‘s statistical significance in Hypothesis 
3.15 and its direction in Hypothesis 3.17 (Table 13).  
An occurring of a debt crisis during [t-1, t+1] did lower output losses. This was against 
expectations. However, this variable was statistically insignificant across all regressions 
(3.11, 3.15, and 3.17). Nevertheless, the variable debt crisis always kept its negative 
direction, suggesting that a debt crisis lowers output losses.  
The variables measuring public debt to GDP, inflation, and deposits to GDP were all 
statistically significant at the 5%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The results show that 
higher levels of public debt to GDP will yield lower output losses, which was against 
theoretical expectations and against the findings of Fink et al. (2004). I theorize that higher 
levels of public debt to GDP will act as a disciplining device to resolve the crisis better at 
lower costs. Also, a preceding inflation before a banking crisis seems to lower output losses, 
which is against expectations and the findings in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
who conclude that an increased risk of banking sector problems may be one of the 
consequences of a high rate of inflation, possibly because the high and volatile nominal 
interest rates associated with high inflation make it difficult for banks to perform maturity 
transformation. The variable measuring deposits to GDP is thought to be an indicator of 
financial stock levels for financing economic activity. Thus higher levels would need longer 
to be used and therefore could longer withstand pressures. However, our findings positively 
relate the variable deposits to GDP to output loss which is against expectations but exactly as 
in the findings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Robustness testing this variable 
proofed the variable‘s direction of effects on output losses but did not confirm the variable‘s 
statistical significance.  
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The variable measuring government owned bank assets increases output loss statistically 
insignificantly but always keeps its positive direction throughout the robustness tests. As 
hypothesized and according to the findings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), this 
result implies that a higher share of government owned bank assets yields higher output 
losses. In summary, I observe a goodness of fit of 0.47 and an F-value of 2 yielding an 
overall significant regression at the 10% level for Hypothesis 3.11.  
Hypothesis 3.12 finds that countries with French or Socialist law origins statistically 
significantly experience lower output loss. On the other hand, French or Socialist law origin 
countries were found to experience more often crises. In the original database of Laeven and 
Valencia (2008), out of 124 crisis periods 96 happen in countries with French or Socialist law 
origins. According to the database by LLSV (1999), worldwide exist 129 countries with 
French or Socialist law origins, out of a total 268 countries worldwide. Therefore, in 47% of 
the countries happened about 75% of the larger financial crises. This information lets us 
suggest that countries with another legal origin than French or Socialist (often developed 
countries) face less often but stronger financial crises. Robustness testing this variable 
proofed the variable‘s statistical significance in Hypothesis 3.15 and its direction in 
Hypothesis 3.17.  
Financial liberalization before banking crises did not statistically significantly affect output 
loss. This was confirmed by robustness testing this variable as the variable even changed 
directions. This finding is contrary to the results in Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
and our expectations which suggested that financial liberalizations increase output losses. 
However, our empirical results suggest that financial liberalizations are either not worsening 
the crisis or are not measured correctly but have an effect on banking crises. Overall, this 
hypothesis‘ R-Square (0.16), the F-value (1.43) and P-Value (0.25) show the insignificance 
of this regression. Hypothesis 3.12 is therefore rejected.  
Hypothesis 3.13 confirmed statistically significantly at the 5 percent level, that introducing an 
explicit deposit insurance results in higher output loss, even while controlling for other 
factors. Robustness testing this variable proofed the variable‘s statistical significance in 
Hypothesis 3.16 and its direction in Hypothesis 3.17. R-Square (0.16), F-value (6.4) and P-
Value (0.016) of Hypothesis 3.13 show the significance of this regression. Hypothesis 3.13 is 
therefore not rejected. 
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Hypothesis 3.14 found a positive relation of large scale government intervention to output 
losses, exactly as Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2003) reported. This confirms their 
finding that large scale government interventions in fact harm the economy. However, this 
variable is not statistically significant but nevertheless keeps its positive sign also in the 
robustness tests (3.16 and 3.17). The same applies also to depositor losses which are 
statistically insignificantly increasing output losses. Overall, Hypothesis 3.14 is not 
statistically different from zero (P-Value of 0.536) and therefore rejected.  
Looking at hypotheses 3.11 to 3.14 shows that only hypotheses 3.11 and 3.13 were 
statistically significant, hypotheses 3.11 and 3.14 are not statistically different from zero. In 
summary, I found that initial conditions in the pre-crisis year, countries‘ law origins, the 
introduction of an explicit deposit insurance and the parallel occurrence of a currency crisis 
are most significantly explaining output losses. These findings let us suggest that once a crisis 
started, governments are only able to mitigate the crisis to a certain extend as more generous 
support to the banking system might only increase fiscal costs but does not lower output loss, 
exactly as Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven (2003) also concluded.  
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Table 14. Banking Crises Effects’ Regression Results for Fiscal Cost 
This table shows the results from the OLS regressions on banking crises effects (Hypotheses 4.11 to 4.14), by regressing 
FISCAL COST on a set of explanatory as well as control variables. FISCAL COST equals the net fiscal cost as 
percentage of GDP during [t, t+5], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS equals 1 if a currency crisis occurred during the 
period [t-1, t+1], the dummy DEBT CRISIS equals 1 if a sovereign debt crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], 
PUBLICDEBT/GDP equals the general government gross debt to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, INFLATION equals the 
percentage change of the GDP deflator in the pre-crisis year t-1, DEPOSITS/GDP equals the total deposits taking 
institutions to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, GOVERNMENT OWNED corresponds to the government owned share of 
the banking system assets in the pre-crisis year t-1, the dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is based on 
French or Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La Porta et al. (2000)), FINANCIAL 
LIBERALIZATION measures major financial liberalizations during [t-5, t] through an index of financial liberalization 
(Abiad and Mody, 2005), the dummy DEPOSIT INSURANCE equals 1 if the government introduced a deposit 
insurance or blanket guarantee during [t, t+3], the dummy LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION equals 1 if the 
government intervened in banks during [t, t+3], and the dummy DEPOSITOR LOSSES equals 1 if depositors of failed 
banks incurred losses during [t, t+3]. The data was obtained, if not specified otherwise, from Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) and looks at the time range of 1970 to 2007. ―t‖ equals the starting year of the banking crisis. The sample consists 
of 42 banking crises. P-Values are in brackets. * /** /*** denotes statistical significance on the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: FISCAL COST 
Explanatory variables 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 
(Constant) 0.0588 (0.577) 0.121 (0.126) 0.084 (0.000) 0.063 * (0.35) 
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.129 ** (0.045)       
DEBTCRISIS -0.069 (0.456)       
PUBLICDEBTGDP 0.004 (0.956)       
INFLATION -0.007 (0.221)       
DEPOSITSGDP 0.011 (0.879)       
GOVOWNED 0.045 (0.773)       
FSLAW   -0.004 (0.934)     
FINLIBERAL   0.001 (0.935)     
DEPOSITINSURANCE     
0.140 *** 
(0.001) 
  
INTERVENTION       0.091 (0.204) 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES       -0.042 (0.341) 
 
R Square 0.205 0.017 0.150 0.062 
F 0.710 0.149 7.020 1.218 
P-Value 0.680 0.962 0.004 *** 0.307 
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Table 15. Banking Crises Effects’ Robustness Test Regression Results for Fiscal 
Cost 
This table shows the results from the OLS regressions on banking crises effects, by regressing FISCAL COST on a set 
of explanatory as well as control variables. FISCAL COST equals the net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP during [t, 
t+5], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS equals 1 if a currency crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], the dummy 
DEBT CRISIS equals 1 if a sovereign debt crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], PUBLICDEBT/GDP equals the 
general government gross debt to GDP in the pre-crisis year t-1, INFLATION equals the percentage change of the 
GDP deflator in the pre-crisis year t-1, DEPOSITS/GDP equals the total deposits taking institutions to GDP in the pre-
crisis year t-1, GOVERNMENT OWNED corresponds to the government owned share of the banking system assets in 
the pre-crisis year t-1, the dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is based on French or Socialist law at 
time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La Porta et al. (2000)), FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION measures 
major financial liberalizations during [t-5, t] through an index of financial liberalization (Abiad and Mody, 2005), the 
dummy DEPOSIT INSURANCE equals 1 if the government introduced a deposit insurance or blanket guarantee 
during [t, t+3], the dummy LARGE-SCALE INTERVENTION equals 1 if the government intervened in banks during 
[t, t+3], and the dummy DEPOSITOR LOSSES equals 1 if depositors of failed banks incurred losses during [t, t+3]. 
The data was obtained, if not specified otherwise, from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and looks at the time range of 
1970 to 2007. ―t‖ equals the starting year of the banking crisis. The sample consists of 42 banking crises. P-Values are 
in brackets. * /** /*** denotes statistical significance on the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: FISCAL COST 
Explanatory variables 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 
(Constant) 0.244 (0.2219 
0.104 *** 
(0.000) 
0.047 (0.48) -2.127 (0.436) 
OUTPUTLOSS   0.16 ** (0.003) 0.116 (0.222) 0.398 (0.307) 
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.162 * (0.0953)     -0.034 (0.891) 
DEBTCRISIS -0.042 (0.727)     -0.043 (0.862) 
PUBLICDEBTGDP 0.012 (0.919)     0.008 (0.977) 
INFLATION -0.009 (0.328)     -0.0418 (0.439) 
DEPOSITSGDP 0.048 (0.670)     -0.088 (0.626) 
GOVOWNED 0.076 (0.709)     -0.211 (0.608) 
FSLAW -0.0257 (0.796)     0.044 (0.794) 
FINLIBERAL -0.001 (0.407)     0.004 (0.914) 
DEPOSITINSURANCE     0.073 (0.176) 0.107 (0.458) 
INTERVENTION     0.055 (0.443) 2.242 (0.404) 
DEPOSITORSLOSSES     -0.011 (0.824) -0.183 (0.336) 
 
R Square 0.314 0.100 0.207 0.783 
F 0.490 4.801 2.028 0.724 
P-Value 0.905 0.043 ** 0.115 0.723 
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3.2.4.2 Determinants of fiscal costs (Hypotheses 4.11 to 4.14) 
Table 14 reports the results of hypotheses 4.11 to 4.14 in which I regress a set of explanatory 
variables on fiscal costs. In order to robustness test the hypotheses 4.11 to 4.14, I combined 
these hypotheses in various forms in 4.15 to 4.18 (Table 15). 
Hypothesis 4.11 shows, as expected, that a parallel currency crisis increases fiscal costs 
statistically significantly at the 5% level. Robustness testing this variable proofed the 
variable‘s statistical significance in Hypothesis 4.15 and its direction in Hypothesis 4.18. All 
other variables in Hypothesis 4.11 yield inconclusive results. A parallel debt crisis is 
statistically insignificantly decreasing fiscal costs. This result holds also in the robustness 
tests but this variables negative effect on fiscal cost is clearly against our expectations as this 
would imply that a parallel debt crisis has a positive effect on banking crises‘ fiscal costs. On 
the other hand, public debt to GDP robustly but statistically insignificantly increases fiscal 
costs as expected and exactly as in Fink et al. (2004). This might suggest that a higher ratio of 
public debt to GDP might increase the severity of the crisis as governments are facing 
financial constraints during their crisis intervention. Empirical results for the variable 
inflation suggest that inflation decreases fiscal costs statistically insignificantly but robustly 
across different regressions. This was against our expectation and the findings in Demirgüc-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997) who show inflation to increase fiscal costs.  
The variable measuring deposits to GDP does not yield any clear effect on fiscal costs and 
even changes its direction across different robustness regressions. Also the ratio of 
government owned bank assets does not influence fiscal cost in any clear direction. Overall, 
hypothesis 4.11 shows a low F- and high P-value, thus is not statistically different from zero. 
Therefore Hypothesis 4.11 is clearly rejected because the chosen initial condition variables 
don‘t affect fiscal costs significantly.  
Also hypothesis 4.12 doesn‘t yield significant results and therefore has to be rejected. Both 
variables measuring the legal origin of a country and financial liberalizations preceding a 
banking crisis are statistically insignificant and change directions in the robustness tests. On 
the other hand, explicit deposit insurances in hypothesis 4.13 increase fiscal costs statistically 
significantly at the 1 percent level. Thus, exactly as in Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), I find 
that government intervention in form of introducing blanket guarantees on deposits will 
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significantly increase fiscal costs. I conclude that Hypothesis 4.13 with a P-Value of 0.004 is 
not rejected and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4.14 doesn‘t yield statistically significant results and has to be rejected. 
Nevertheless, both variables, measuring large-scale government interventions and depositors‘ 
losses, affect fiscal cost in the expected direction. Interventions robustly increase fiscal costs 
(3.14, 3.17 and 3.18) suggesting that large-scale government interventions indeed result in 
higher costs, as suggested by Honohan and Klingebiel (2003). On the other hand, depositor‘s 
loss robustly decreased fiscal costs. This finding therefore may imply that depositors carried 
losses that otherwise might have occurred to the government.  
Overall, only hypotheses 4.14 and 4.18 were statistically significant and thus all other 
hypotheses are not statistically different from zero as such. However, fiscal costs might be 
related to more generous government intervention activities such as issuing deposit 
insurances and large-scale interventions. The same conclusion was reported by Honohan and 
Klingebiel (2003). Especially hypotheses 3.13/ 3.14 and 4.13/4.14 could imply that more 
generous bailouts only result in higher fiscal cost, but not lower output losses. As Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008), I also found that government intervention might only explain part of the 
fiscal cost because most fiscal cost might occur through foregone tax revenues due to output 
losses. Also, the relation of fiscal cost to output loss is yet inconclusive because both 
variables might be endogenous and any direct relation could stem from a third, yet 
unaccounted, variable that affects both. 
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Table 16. Banking Crises Effects’ Regression Results for Robustness Test II 
This Table 16 shows the results from the robustness test OLS regressions on banking crises effects by using OUTPUT 
LOSS and FISCAL COST as dependent variable. The sample consists of 124 banking crises. OUTPUT LOSS equals the 
difference of the real GDP and trend real GDP in percentage of the trend real GDP for the period [t, t+3], FISCAL 
COST equals the net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP during [t, t+5], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS equals 1 if a 
currency crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], and the dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is 
based on French or Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La Porta et al. (2000)). The data was 
obtained, if not specified otherwise, from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and looks at the time range of 1970 to 2007. ―t‖ 
equals the starting year of the banking crisis. P-Values are in brackets. * /** /*** denotes statistical significance on the 
10%/ 5%/ 1% level, respectively. 
  Regressed on OUTPUT LOSS 
Variables Constant 
Beta- 
coefficient Error term F-value P-Value  
FISCALCOSTNET 5.782 0.918 0.48 14.929 0 *** 
CURRENCYCRISIS 15.175 10.343 0.182 3.491 0.065 * 
FSLAW 17.396 2.182 0.034 0.117 0.733 
  
  Regressed on FISCAL COST 
Variables Constant 
Beta- 
coefficient Error term F-value P-Value  
OUTPUTLOSS 10.311 0.25 0.48 14.929 0 *** 
CURRENCYCRISIS 10.749 9.31 0.331 7.276 0.009 *** 
FSLAW 13.857 0.324 0.01 0.006 0.938 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Banking Crises Effects’ correlation matrix for Robustness test II 
This Table 17 shows the correlations between each robustness test variable that was further robustness tested for the 
empirical study II on banking crises effects. The sample consists of 124 banking crises. OUTPUT LOSS equals the 
difference of the real GDP and trend real GDP in percentage of the trend real GDP for the period [t, t+3], FISCAL 
COST NET equals the net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP during [t, t+5], the dummy CURRENCY CRISIS equals 1 if 
a currency crisis occurred during the period [t-1, t+1], and the dummy FS LAW equals 1 if a country‘s legal origin is 
based on French or Socialist law at time t (index of countries‘ legal origins from La Porta et al. (2000)). The data was 
obtained, if not specified otherwise, from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and looks at the time range of 1970 to 2007. ―t‖ 
equals the starting year of the banking crisis. ** indicate that the variables are statistically significantly correlated at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed). 
Variables FISCALCOST NET OUTPUT LOSS FSLAW 
CURRENCY 
CRISIS 
FISCALCOSTNET 1.00    
OUTPUTLOSS 0.47 ** 1.00   
FSLAW 0.01 0.03 1.00  
CURRENCYCRISIS 0.33 ** 0.18 0.16 1.00 
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3.2.4.3 Robustness checks 
To further robustness check the results of the determinants of crisis costs, I divide the sample 
into developing and developed countries, market-based and bank-based countries, French/ 
Socialist Law Origin Countries and Other Law Origin Countries, and financial liberalized and 
not liberalized countries. Finally, I also split the sample into countries with high government 
ownership and low government ownership in banks. In most cases my results yielded similar 
results to the earlier ones. However, while splitting the sample into developed and developing 
countries, I found that current accounts to GDP showed a strong and negative impact on 
output loss at the 10% confidence level in the group of developed countries. This suggests 
that positive current account balances of developed countries are associated to less severe 
economic output loss. Otherwise, no differences between developed and developing countries 
were found. This is exactly as in Hoggarth et al (2002) who note that output losses associated 
with banking crises are not more severe in developing countries than in developed countries. 
Furthermore, I excluded transition countries from my regression. This, however, did not yield 
significantly different results. 
Earlier I proofed that the legal origin of a country and a parallel currency crisis were good 
explanatory variables of output loss and fiscal costs. Therefore, I robustness test my results 
for these two variables. The new sample consists of 124 banking crisis datasets between 1970 
and 2007 and is obtained from the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008). The results are 
seen in Table 16 and 17. Neither of the variables‘ results yielded any new findings as 
variables kept their original statistical in- or significance. Also direct correlations were 
constant to earlier findings (Table 9 vs. Table 17). These results proof that my original results 
are robust across different model specifications and datasets.  
3.2.5 Time to next presidential elections 
Finally, a new variable called TIMETOELECTION is introduced which measures the time 
until the next presidential elections. A large set of literature suggests that the more time that 
remains until the next presidential elections, the more heavily currently elected officials 
discount the benefits of re-elections. Indeed, Keefer (2001) found that when presidential 
elections are close, governments make smaller fiscal transfers to the financial sector and are 
less likely to exercise forbearance. Thus, I hypothesize that if there are presidential elections 
in the near future, fiscal costs of banking crises interventions will be smaller. 
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H5.11 Close-by elections decrease fiscal costs of banking crises.  
I use the same OLS methodology and the same set of 42 banking crises between 1970 and 
2007 as for my hypotheses 3.11 to 3.14 and 4.11 to 4.14. The core data on how much time is 
left to the next presidential election is obtained from the dataset by Keefer (2001).  
 
 
I find a strong relationship between how much time is left to the next presidential election 
and fiscal costs (Table 18). This suggests that near-by elections might ensure that politicians-
in-power refrain from transferring public wealth to private wealth. Elections might therefore 
serve as a disciplining device. I conclude, exactly as Keefer (2001), that near-by elections 
lower fiscal wealth transfer to the financial sector. However, any relation between the time to 
the next presidential election and the containment phase and resolution phase crisis variables 
were insignificant.  
Concluding this second empirical part, I find in summary that initial conditions in the pre-
crisis year, the introduction of a deposit insurance, a country‘s French or Socialist legal origin 
and a parallel currency crisis explain most significantly economic output losses. Also, fiscal 
cost is in part related to more generous government intervention activities such as issuing 
deposit insurances, exactly as Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) reported. Costly government 
intervention such as introducing deposit insurances seems to result in higher fiscal costs and 
possibly even increase output losses through feedback effects from fiscal costs to economic 
growth. The variables measuring countries‘ legal origins and a parallel currency crisis were 
robustness tested on a larger sample of 124 banking crises and yielded similar results to the 
Table 18. Time-to-Election Effects’ OLS Regression Results for fiscal cost, 
Hypothesis 5.11 
This Table 18 shows the results from my OLS regression elections influence on fiscal costs, where fiscal cost was 
employed as the dependent variable. My variable of interest researches the time to the next presidential elections and its 
relation to FISCAL COST NET which equals the net fiscal cost as percentage of GDP during [t, t+5]. The sample 
consists of 42 banking crises between 1970 and 2007 and t signifies the starting year of the banking crisis. * /** /*** 
denotes statistical significance on the 10%/ 5%/ 1% level, respectively. 
  Regressed on FISCALCOSTNET 
Variables Constant 
Beta - 
coefficient 
Error 
term 
F-value 
P-Value 
Regression 
TIMETOELECTION  0.001 0.054 0.733 46.502 0.001*** 
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original regressions, thus confirming their robustness. However, while splitting the sample 
into developed and developing countries, I found that the variable current accounts showed a 
strong and negative impact on output loss at the 10% confidence level in the group of 
developed countries. In addition, near-by elections were found to significantly decrease fiscal 
costs.   
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4 Case study: the U.S. credit and banking crisis of 2007 
Banking crises‘ determinants of our first empirical study would not have accurately detected 
the U.S. credit and banking crisis that started in 2007. Exactly as Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), 
I suggest therefore that every banking crisis might be different. Thus, I investigate the U.S. 
banking crisis that started in 2007, its development and origins, in a case study. In this 
financial crisis, securitization first disrupted the capital market. However, as the theory of 
financial systems suggested, bank and capital markets are substantially interrelated. Thus, a 
twin crisis materialized also this time.  
Following the media and public discussion shows that a large part of the population has yet 
not understood the true origins of the crisis. In addition I have proven that current research 
may not yet be able to employ correct determinants of banking crises which reliably explain 
banking crises. This case study will therefore review the literature about this banking crisis 
and its individual reasons and origins. I argue that understanding this financial crisis 
extensive negative effect requires understanding the crisis‘ deeper (sometimes indirect) 
origins and its development. Therefore I describe firstly the development of the crisis. 
Secondly, I seek to understand the crisis by digging deeper into the crises‘ origins. 
Securitization, the institutional environment, account imbalances and hubris are identified as 
major origins of this crisis. Earlier research has not identified such broad but in-depth origins 
of the crisis comprehensively. Therefore, this case study adds to the literature a valuable and 
thorough review of the current literature on the U.S. credit and banking crisis‘ important 
reasons and origins.  
4.1 The development of the U.S. banking and credit crisis of 2007 
The financial innovation called subprime mortgages made the ―American Dream‖ come true 
by providing home ownership opportunities to riskier borrowers in the United States of 
America (U.S.). Lending to this group of riskier borrowers involved a mortgage design 
feature that resulted in a link to house appreciation. As Listokin et al. already in the year 2000 
noted, underwriting and mortgage standards would have to differ completely for this group of 
borrowers. This needed change in mortgage policy was made possible through technological 
change in standardizing and routinizing loan application procedures (LaCour-Little, 2000, 
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Straka, 2000, and Gates, Perry and Zorn, 2002). Efficiency enhancement made the procedure 
less costly but didn‘t change the related higher risks to this class of borrowers 11 
These subprime mortgages were financed via securitization which then again was financed 
through Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). CDO tranches were thereafter often sold to 
off-balance sheet vehicles and money market mutual funds. These vehicles (derivatives, 
securitizations and repo markets) are often called ―shadow banking system‖ (Gorton, 2008) 
which is clearly a negative synonym as the demand for transparency strongly increased 
during the last decade. Unlike securitization of other types of assets such as prime mortgages, 
credit cards and auto loans, subprime securitization has dynamic tranching linked to excess 
spread and prepayment resulting in sensitivity to house prices. The fact that CDOs were often 
even only synthetic ABS bonds (not enough bonds were available at that time) and that ABS 
CDS needed less capital to construct a collateral pool, increased the systemic risk in addition 
(Turnbull, Crouhy and Jarrow, 2007). Also, dealer banks only knew their subprime structures 
and the placement of the bonds but no information mechanism was existent for a long time. 
Only after the creation of the ABX index, information on the value of the underlying 
subprime mortgages slowly became revealed. Subprime mortgages relied on increasing house 
prices and the successful refinancing. This was between 2001 and 2005 possible as house 
prices increased on average by 54.4 percent in the same time span.
12
 Also, the ratio of median 
house price to median household income rose from a historically stable ratio of three times 
(1970 – 2000) to five times in 2006 (Leonhardt, 2007). However, during 2006 and 2007, 
house prices declined by about 5 percent. This was the start of a drastic decline. Lower house 
prices and higher mortgage rates triggered mortgage refinancing problems and therefore a 
strong increase in foreclosures. This in turn increased underwriting standards, decreased 
again house prices, which consequently resulted in even more foreclosures.  
Information and knowledge gaps existed because of the complexity and of lagging 
information on house prices and mortgage performance. Overall, general knowledge on the 
effects and timing of house price changes was lacking (Gorton, 2008). Only the ABX index 
provided transparent prices of subprime risk despite liquidity problems and allowed to short 
on the subprime market (Gorton, 2008). After the ABX.HE‘s start in 2006, valuation of the 
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underlying subprime mortgages became slowly more efficient but the first indices in 2006 
were still relatively high and inefficient despite the first signs of a house price meltdown. 
After a strong increase in subprime mortgage defaults (noted in February 2007), the 2007 
editions of the ABX index immediately dived upon trade start or even opened significantly 
below par (Gorton, 2008). This means that the cost of insuring a basket of mortgages of a 
certain rating against default increased strongly. Following, UBS shut down its internal hedge 
fund, Dillon Read, in May 2007 after suffering about $125 million subprime-related losses. 
Also Moody´s, alongside Standard & Poor´s and Fitch, put 62 tranches of 21 U.S. subprime 
deals on ―downgrade review‖ during May 2007. The significant overvaluation of subprime 
mortgages became obvious latest during June and July 2007.  
Thereafter the run on ABCPs and SIVs started and consequently made refinancing of short 
term funding difficult for these vehicles. SIVs had to be put back onto their sponsor‘s balance 
sheet and finally disappeared. Grand names such as Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas suffered 
enormous losses from their funds, and the German IKB and American Home Mortgage 
Investment Corp. were or were close to bankruptcy. Surprisingly, despite all these losses and 
write-downs, the SIVs original exposure to subprime mortgages was rather small with only 
2% overall (Gorton, 2008). Instead, the uncertainties around this asymmetric information and 
the inability to value the SIVs portfolios caused this run. Following ―cash was king‖, which 
made the basic form of secured lending, repurchase agreements (repo), to almost disappear. 
This market was generally believed to amount to up to $11.5 trillion by 2007 (Geithner, 
2008) but by August of the same year this market disappeared almost instantly and entirely 
for months. This was due to the fact that the collateral was believed to have no market in 
which it could be sold due to missing liquidity and uncertainty and was therefore invaluable.  
Especially ratings of any kind of structured products were mistrusted and therefore most 
ABS, RMBS or CMBS bond were almost untradeable. Thus without repo, assets could only 
be sold at very low prices which in turn caused the mark-to-market value of all assets to fall, 
making it even more unlikely to start trading repos again. Any intervention by central banks 
was challenging as the ability to track loans (syndicated) was very low. Therefore central 
banks had to institute costly substitute measures to account for these high market 
inefficiencies.  
In August 2007 started the first wave of illiquid financial intermediaries, increasing the 
LIBOR which then again prompted the European Central Bank (ECB) to inject €95 billion 
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and the U.S. Federal Reserve to inject $ 24 billion into the interbank overnight credit market. 
The U.S. Federal Fund Rate was continuously decreased and the Bank of England provided 
liquidity to the Northern Rock bank (Shin, 2009). As the crisis unfold, despite large central 
bank efforts
13
, write-downs of mortgage-related securities continued.  
In conclusion, I recognize a complex building of interlinked connections that, in combination 
with information, political and efficiency uncertainties and asymmetries, led to this panic. 
Obviously, the complexity of this chain resulted in information losses due to the fact that the 
original mortgage could not be penetrated anymore. Especially the end buyer of shares in 
RMBS, CDOs, SIVs and money market funds substituted missing knowledge of the product 
with agency relationships, i.e. the products‘ ratings and the (long term) relationship with the 
banker. This might be one explanation for questions such as why rational firms and 
individuals invested in unknown products.  
4.2 The origins of the U.S. banking and credit crisis of 2007 
This crisis has a large set of origins. An introduction into the ―flawed‖ structure of 
securitization will be followed by a description of further origins of this crisis such as the 
U.S. institutional environment, financial fragility, global imbalances and the rise of hubris.  
4.2.1 Securitization 
Rise in Subprime Mortgages 
Subprime mortgages became very popular in the first decade of the new century. They solved 
the problematic question of how to lend to risky borrowers by bringing the innovation of 
benefiting from house price appreciation over short time horizons. The house‘s appreciation 
in price is the basis for refinancing the mortgage every two to three years. The refinancing 
exists as an option to the lender. In addition, the initial monthly payment is based on a 
―teaser‖ interest rate being fixed for the first two to three years after which the loan will 
―reset‖ to its higher and ―real‖ interest rate which is mostly floating for the rest of the usually 
30 years mortgage pay-back duration. The second rate is more burdensome and not always 
affordable. The main design features were therefore the refinancing option in order to avoid 
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the reset rate as well as the prepayment penalty in order not to refinance too early
14
. 
Therefore, with a high-step up rate as well as a prepayment penalty and a possible default of 
the borrower, the lender has all the decision power over the outcome thanks to this roll-over 
option. Consequently, being long the house, the lender is highly sensitive to house prices 
because mostly the initial ―teaser‖-period is even yielding a negative profit. However, a 
borrower is largely tied to the initial lender and his predatory lending (Gorton, 2008). The 
borrower might not even understand that the right to use the house for short, revolving 
periods of time is at the lenders disposal. At each refinancing event, the borrower optimally 
built up equity to receive lower interest rates or faced the lender taking its right to opt out and 
take the recovery amount. Until the year 2006, house prices rose and up to 80% of mortgages 
were refinanced within five years (Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2008).  
However, banks and borrowers disregarded the fact that housing cycles with their booms and 
busts are existent already for decades. Also this time, after the construction peak in early 
2006 house prices had fallen by around 40% within one year. This resulted in a massive 
overhang of excess supply over demand for housing. Housing vacancies skyrocketed 
subsequently and were out of line compared to population and prosperity growth
15
 (Ellies, 
2008). This overhang created extreme vulnerability in housing prices which was speeding 
itself up with the first foreclosure waves enlarging the overhang furthermore. Compared to 
other countries such as Spain and the U.K. which faced difficulties in providing sufficient 
amount of housing for its population, the U.S. had created itself a large supply overhang. This 
overhang with a turn in the housing cycle led to severe consequences.  
Securities‘ design: Flawed risks and reward patterns 
Securitization makes it possible to disperse risk which was often mistaken with reducing 
risks. Theoretically, dispersed credit risk lowers the chances of bank failures and financial 
instability as when credit risk is concentrated in a few banks. However, being able to separate 
credit risk from market risk and selling risks separately away resulted investors to invest into 
larger bets with less down payment and resulted banks to issue more loans and other 
securities (Anderson and Timmons, 2007, Tett, 2007). Therefore more risk is taken on since 
individuals‘ risks are dispersible. However, it was disregarded that the systemic risk 
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increased overall. Additionally, the supposed reduction in risks causes lower asset price 
volatility which in turn permits players to increase their leverage, buy more assets and thus 
increase asset prices. However, as soon as volatility and capital cost increases and asset prices 
and liquidity fall, the process of de-leveraging energetically starts a downward spiral 
(Independent Strategy, 2007). Additionally, due to the once beneficial dispersing of risk, only 
a small amount of information about the risk location exists. Also, it is questionable whether 
most investors understood the nature of these risks and environmental changes in banking 
methods of granting credit where personal credit history and borrower characteristics are 
replaced by impersonal statistical methods of credit assessment. These ―efficiency 
increasing‖ shifts in credit assessment have undervalued and mispriced risks massively.  
Securities‘ design: missing transparency  
The complex nature of asset-backed structured products forced many small and mid-sized 
investors to rely heavily on credit ratings. However, rating agencies were not stating clearly 
the precise meanings of their ratings and the robustness of their methodologies for such 
products. Secondly, structured products were not transparent about the type of assets 
underlying which made investors expect the worst, exposure to the subprime market. 
Consequently, this created a market for ―lemons‖. Third, lack of transparency concerning the 
valuation of illiquid assets resulted investors to lose confidence into the posted prices and the 
creditworthiness of counterparties. Fourth, financial intermediaries did not transparently 
disclose their total magnitude of commitments received (e.g. lines of credits). Finally, banks 
did not transparently disclose the size of their assets in the warehouse which again lead to 
investors‘ uncertainties and possibly even more volatile share prices of banks. However, all 
these securitization design failures may not have been possible without a favourable 
institutional environment. 
4.2.2 Institutional environment 
Eased U.S. lending standards  
Since the beginning of the year 2000, many countries eased their lending standards but, 
despite issues about the comparability of standards between countries, a lot of research 
suggests that the U.S. did ease lending standards the most (Gorton, 2008, Kiff and Mills, 
2007, Gerardi et al., 2008). Firstly, a range of legislative and policy changes were undertaken 
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to encourage the development of a non-conforming (subprime and Alt-A) lending sector 
which did not confine to the government sponsored enterprise (GSEs) models (Ellies, 2008). 
Reasons and motivations behind these moves lie largely in the politics of George W. Bush 
who formulated it a prime goal to make home ownership available to ethnic minorities who 
had usually been overseen by mortgage lenders (Gramlich, 2007). Secondly, the Bush 
administration had to find a quick way of recovering from the bursting of the ―IT-bubble‖ in 
the early 2000‘s. Pushing the housing sector seemed a viable option. Thirdly, GSE‘s 
domination in the mortgage market had to be reduced (after accounting and governance 
irregularities) through caps and competition (Kiff and Mills 2007, Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson 2008). 
As lending standards were eased, the bet on rising collateral value overweighed 
considerations about the actual lender (Gorton, 2008). Also second mortgages, either at 
purchase (piggyback) or later (home equity credit line), had increased (Avery, Brevoort and 
Canner 2007). Thus, a 100% financing was made possible without having to pay any 
mortgage insurance. To make facts even worse, Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) prove with 
LoanPerformance data that in many cases the first mortgage lender didn‘t know about the 
second mortgage. Earlier, this ―silent second lien‖ was almost inexistent but by 2006 over 
25% of subprime and 40% of Alt-A securitized mortgages actually had a ―silent second lien‖. 
Consequently, many first mortgages had to be actually mispriced. This obviously raises 
questions concerning legislation policies in the area of mortgage recording.  
Despite the fact that 100% financing is also available in other countries, only the U.S. had 
changed it from low loan to value ratios (LTV) and fixed-interest rates to eased standards, 
high LTV and adjustable-rate mortgages, respectively (Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004). In 
addition, Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) found that even down payments were often third-
party contributions such as family and friends. Even real estate sellers helped funding down 
payments via their own ―charity organizations‖ in return for inflating the actual house price. 
Montgomery (2008) found that seller-financed down payment mortgages are 300% more 
likely to end in foreclosure which finally led the Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention 
Act of 2008 to prevent such actions totally.  
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Loose U.S. monetary policy 
In theory, monetary policy influences economic growth and inflation, especially through its 
interest rate setting function that impacts future movements of macroeconomic variables 
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1990). Also, Bernanke and Blinder (1990) and Black and Rosen 
(2008) proofed that monetary policy responds quickly to supply shocks of bank reserves and 
therefore can affect the supply side of the ―credit channel‖. Supply of credit is also affected 
by redistributing loan supply across firms of different sizes (balance sheet channel) and banks 
altering the maturity of new loan originations (aggregate loan supply). However, before this 
financial crisis, a loose monetary policy of the Federal Reserve Bank that begun under 
Greenspan in late 2001, was observable. Originally, these policy actions were meant to pull 
the U.S. economy out of recession but at the same time also helped continue the boom in the 
housing market (Mah-Hui Lim, 2008).  
Wolf (2007 b) argues that the Fed was responsible for the loose monetary policy and argues 
that interest rates should have risen to over 5% in 2005 instead of pushing interest rates down 
to 1% in 2003 and then raising them only slowly (Economist, 2007 a). Giving the theoretical 
background to Taylor‘s and Wolf‘s suggestion, monetary policy transmission would impact  
the ―credit channel‖ also in a way that if money is hold tight, according to Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995), informational frictions in credit markets become worse. This increases in turn 
the external finance premium which therefore enhances the wanted effects of monetary policy 
on the real economy. However, money was hold loosely and exactly the opposite happened in 
the real economy; asset prices and especially house prices rose which caused excessive 
consumption and a ―bubble‖. The bubble arose due to the fact that central banks shifted their 
focus of monetary policy more and more towards financial stability (due to periods of low 
inflation and increased global financial markets) at the cost of focusing on stable asset prices 
and low inflation. Therefore the traditional main objective of central banks, stabilization of 
prices and outputs, were possibly competing with newer objectives (Violi, 2008).  
The U.S. tax system 
The tax system in the U.S. has certain features that highly encouraged high loan to value 
ratios. Firstly, mortgage interest of the house where the owner lives in, are income tax 
deductible like in other countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands and partly Spain. 
However, the imputed rent is also tax-free which is contrary to the other countries mentioned 
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above. Therefore the U.S. tax system encourages home ownership and even more, to have 
high mortgages that might even finance other non-housing assets. Also, there is no real 
incentive to prepay a mortgage ahead of time and generally keep the loan-to-valuation ratio 
higher. This might explain certain features such as interest-only mortgages and the rapid 
increase of negative equity (Ellies, 2008). Drees and Pazarbasiouglu (1998) found that Nordic 
countries faced similar tax treatments in the 1980s during which a strong housing boom was 
existent but led to a burst in the beginning of the 1990s. 
The Glass-Steagall Act 
After the Great Depression of the 1930‘s, the U.S. government tightened anti-trust laws and 
banking regulations to protect as well as stabilize the financial system. One of the most 
important Acts passed was the Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial from investment 
banks and prohibited interstate banking. Furthermore, the Act also regulated commercial 
banks‘ activities such as interest rates charged and entry into riskier investments (Mah-Hui 
Lim, 2008). However, since the 1970‘s commercial banks lobbied against the Glass-Steagall 
Act with success as from Reagan onwards until 1999 under Clinton‘s administration the Act 
was continuously lowered and finally dismissed. Thereafter, commercial banks were again 
able to engage in investment banking activities that included underwriting and trading of 
bonds and other security types. However, this resulted in a conflict of interest as banks often 
receive higher fees for investment banking activities compared to commercial loan fees. 
Thus, banks sacrificed the latter. The ratio of noninterest income from investment banking to 
net interest income from lending continuously rose from 0.25 in 1980 to 0.75 in 2005 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2007). Investment banking income continuously 
rose but was also riskier and more volatile. Besides investment banks‘ risk taking, also their 
capital supply increased highly due to global account imbalances. 
4.2.3 Global account imbalances 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 was caused by emerging countries‘ financing of account 
deficits with private capital inflows which were as quickly withdrawn as they were flowing 
in. Today on the other hand, most Asian countries have large account surpluses and foreign 
exchange reserves (59% of the world‘s foreign exchange reserves are owned by ten Asian 
countries). Export surplus and excess savings in Asia supported during recent years the 
consumption habits of the U.S. households and government. In 2006, U.S. public debt 
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amounted to $5 trillion of which 44% was hold by foreigners such as Japan ($612 billion) and 
China ($420 billion).
16
 However, even a bigger pile of debt is to be found in U.S. households 
($9.7 trillion in housing loans and $2.4 trillion in credit card loans), corporations ($9 trillion) 
and the financial sector ($14.2 trillion) (Hodges, 2007). Also, 93% of the U.S. account deficit 
in 2007 was financed by the account surpluses of China, Japan, Germany and Saudi Arabia 
(Economist, 2007b). Therefore ―poorer‖ nations financed the consumption habits of U.S. 
households, corporations and the government. Duncan (2007) specifies that especially ABS 
attracted foreign funds. The U.S. is currently the largest debtor nation worldwide but now 
accuses emerging countries of contributing to the crisis due to excess savings whereas during 
the Asian crisis in the late 1990‘s, exactly the same countries were accused of excess deficits. 
Additionally, besides these account imbalances, also imbalances between the real and 
financial economy were existent. 
4.2.4 Increasing financial fragility in the U.S. 
One of the most serious imbalances and misallocations of resources are to be found between 
the U.S. real and financial economy. During the last years, financial transaction volumes 
outweighed drastically the value of productive investments worldwide. Financial assets to 
annual world output ratios used to be about equal (109%) in 1980 but continuously rose to 
over 300% by 2005 (Mah-Hui Lim, 2008). Global financial assets were $140 trillion 
compared to the world‘s total GDP of $48 trillion in 2006 (Wolf, 2007 a). Also, OTC 
derivative transactions and traditional foreign exchange market transactions reach $5.3 
trillion per day whereas world trade is only $12 trillion per year (Bank for international 
Settlement, 2007). Thus the original definition and concept of liquidity, M1, M2 and M3 are 
no longer valid because financial innovations resulted in new concepts of liquidity such as 
derivatives. M1 and M2 only make up 1% of the pyramid, the ―broad money‖ level 9% and 
securitized debt stands at 10%. The rest, accounting for global liquidity, 80% of the total 
$607 trillion liquidity market worldwide is made up of derivatives (Independent Strategy 
2007). These facts proof that central banks have only small control over the global liquidity 
market but face enormous pressure to influence the cost of capital and global liquidity.  
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There existed also a funding mismatch in the shadow banking system
17
 as they sell short-term 
asset-backed commercial paper and medium term notes with maturities between three and 
twelve months to money market funds. To ensure against a drop in demand of these papers 
and thus a funding problem, these vehicles drew down credit lines called ―liquidity 
backstop‖. Therefore, the banking system eventually carried the liquidity risk but kept it 
unrecognized in its balance sheets. Additionally, also investment banks started to fund 
themselves with short-term repos (as explained earlier repos essentially refer to borrowing 
funds by selling and agreeing to repurchase a collateral asset), often just lasting overnight or 
up to three months. As described earlier, the repo-market almost dried out completely at a 
certain point in this crisis and therefore exposed also these banks to vast maturity mismatches 
in addition to the already granted credit lines. In summary, the shadow banking system 
increased liquidity risks and financial fragility, leading to an even larger crisis (Brunnermeier, 
2008). In addition, low equity- high debt deals in form of LBO‘s became again very attractive 
in the beginning of 2000, adding to the financial fragility in the financial system.  
4.2.5 Leveraged buy out  
Leveraged buy outs have exploded in deal and total size during the last decade as loose credit 
standards, excess liquidity and asset prices were increasing. Such private equity funds raised 
$459 billion in 2006 but even more; they borrowed several times over their capital base to 
take over companies
18
. Therefore, cheap credit and excess liquidity resulted in $13.3 trillion 
(equivalent to the GDP of the U.S.) of LBO‘s during 2003 and the first half of 2007. 
Thereafter, LBO deals plummeted and many bridge loans to LBO‘s had to be revalued by 
banks. This revaluation resulted in huge write-downs for banks such as Citbank, Merrill 
Lynch, UBS and Deutsche Bank (i.e. up to $20 billion write-downs for each of these banks). 
As the name already suggests, these LBO deals are highly leveraged to stem the deal, keep 
management‘s motivation and effort at a maximum, align interests and reduce agency costs. 
However, the development of increasingly high leverage deals (from 2004 until 2007 
leverage ratios rose from 4.8 to 8 times) and falling debt servicing capacity (operating profit 
to debt repayment) to 1.8 times from initially 3.4 in 2004, made these deals extremely 
vulnerable to negative macroeconomic developments (Farzad et al., 2007). Mah-Hui Lim 
(2008) observes that lax credit criteria was not only applied in subprime loans but also in 
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LBO deals as seen in ―covenant lite‖ loans (banks waived traditional monitoring rights and 
financial covenants) and payment-in-kind notes (borrowers repay in-kind using another credit 
note).  
Many of these LBO‘s were financed overconfidently with little considerations about a 
possibility of an economic recession.  
4.2.6 The returning of Hubris 
>>Success breeds a disregard of the possibility of failure… As a previous 
financial crisis recedes in time, it is quite natural for central bankers, 
government officials, bankers, businessmen, and even economists to believe a 
new era has arrived<< (Minsky, 1986) 
Already in the 1920‘s, experts proclaimed a new era has arrived which never has been there 
before. This new era therefore justified the fact that stock prices were supposed to only rise. 
Additionally, celebrities such as Winston Churchill assured people of the trustworthiness of 
the financial system and of rising stock prices by investing large funds on his own into the 
stock market. 
Three quarter of a century later, experts found again that this time it is ―different‖. Financial 
innovations, models, safer strategies and levered expert management justified the 
development. Also, major figures in the financial world safe-sung a whole generation about 
how investors use now a different investment technique, private equity, which really adds 
value as proclaimed by David Rubenstein of the Carlyle Group, one of the largest private 
equity funds. Also Joe Anderson of Countrywide Mortgage stated that ―we have a wealth of 
information we didn‘t have before. We understand the data and can price the risk‖ (Farzad et 
al., 2007). Even Alan Greenspan confidently said that the new financial innovations disperse 
the risk to those willing and able to bear it and therefore acts like a shock absorber to prevent 
―cascading failures‖ (cited in Wehrfritz, 2007, Federal Reserve Board, 04/22/2002).  
4.3 Case study conclusion 
In this case study, I reported first the unwinding of the subprime crisis in 2007. It became 
clear that besides decreasing U.S. real estate prices, there were many more factors involved 
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that gave rise to a banking and credit crisis. It turned out that securitization could not 
diminish risk but instead only transferred risk until the risk‘s location became unknown. Also 
otherwise, securitization design showed many flaws when inspected more closely. Mortgage-
backed securities were very difficult to value and not transparent, and moral hazard increased 
due to wrong incentives. However, such securitization needed the right institutional 
environment in which the legislation and monetary policy helped securitization to emerge. 
U.S. mortgage backed securities attracted international capital market funds that required 
AAA-rating investments. These funds therefore indirectly fuelled U.S. household spending. 
Large LBO‘s and the structure of the shadow banking system helped increase financial 
market‘s liquidity risk which became very stretched since the outbreak of this crisis.  
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5 Conclusions 
Section II reviewed the literature on financial systems, banking and banking crises. I 
recognized that understanding banking crises requires understanding the theory of financial 
systems and banking in general. Hence I reviewed firstly the theory of financial systems with 
their most important act of creating liquidity (Boyd and Smith, 1992). Levine (1997) argues 
that banks satisfy random liquidity needs of lenders better (at lower risks) than if these 
lenders would forego financial intermediaries. However, in order to credibly commit to repay 
depositors, banks may have to choose a fragile bank capital structure, as argued by Diamond 
and Rajan (2001). Thus, the risk of a banking crisis may be a necessary disciplinary device in 
an imperfect market.  
When such banking crises take place, various in-depth origins of the crises are found, such as 
inflation, cyclical output downturns, term of trade deterioration, exchange rate crashes, and 
currency as well as asset and real estate devaluations (e.g. Lindgren et al., 1996; Dooley and 
Frankel, 2003; and Collyns and Kincaid, 2003). The literature of determinants of banking 
crises formed various theories on how bank structure and ownership, financial liberalization, 
institutional and political environments, international shocks and exchange rate regimes 
influence the probability of a banking crisis.  
Once a banking crisis is ongoing, the credit crunch hypothesis predicts that decreased bank 
credits to firms decrease investments and expenditure, thus resulting in decreased economic 
output and demand (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache., 2005). 
On the other hand, governments‘ intervention to lower banking crisis effects on the real 
economy results in fiscal costs. Thus, governments actually face a trade-off between fiscal 
and economical cost as higher fiscal spending on government interventions is expected to 
decrease the economical cost of a crisis, and vice-versa (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
However, earlier findings suggest that generous support to the banking system does not 
reduce the output cost of banking crises (Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2003). Thus, I 
recognized that an important question to policy makers and economists is how to decrease the 
negative effects of a banking crisis most efficiently and effectively as well as how to prevent 
a banking crisis at all. Earlier research confirmed that future research on banking crises is 
highly needed. I contribute to the research on banking crises by providing new insights into 
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the determinants and effects of banking crises with new and longer data as well as better and 
further developed variables. 
In the first empirical study Section 3.1 I attempted to find determinants of banking crises. 
GDP growth, real interest rate, inflation, M2 to reserves, creditor rights, GDP per capita and 
financial reforms were hypothesized to have an impact on the probability of a banking crisis. 
I employed a multivariate logit model to evaluate the chosen determinants‘ value in 
explaining 120 banking crisis around the globe during 1980 and 2005. To my knowledge, no 
previous similar study has employed such a large time frame. 
In summary, low GDP growth, highly developed institutional and regulatory environments, 
financial reforms and high GDP per capita increase the probability of a banking crisis 
statistically significantly. The observed factors are often found in developed nations which 
might be therefore more probable to experience a banking crisis. Interestingly, this study 
turned around earlier results of Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) who report countries 
with weak institutional environments, low GDP per capita and low GDP growth to inhibit the 
largest risks of banking crises. Therefore, my study updated the study of Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997) who researched banking crises during 1980 and 1994, turned around their 
results and showed that most variables are correlated to at least one other variable. This 
shows that future research has to focus on developing better determinants of banking crises. 
The second empirical part evaluated banking crises‘ effect on fiscal cost and economic output 
by regressing these two dependent variables on a number of explanatory variables in an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. I argued that financial and structural variables as 
well as government intervention-, monetary- and fiscal policies explain fiscal costs and 
economic output loss of banking crises. From the database by Laeven and Valencia (2008) I 
obtain 42 banking crises datasets for the period 1970 to 2007. In summary, a parallel 
currency crisis and explicit deposit insurance increase the economic output loss. French and 
Socialist law countries experience lower output losses but more frequent crises. Also, higher 
fiscal expenditure didn‘t lower output losses. Exactly as Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven 
(2003) conclude, this result contradicts policy makers‘ believe that government interventions 
are ―necessary‖. Additionally, government interventions result in higher fiscal cost (as in 
Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003) but government intervention might only explain part of the 
fiscal cost because most fiscal costs might, as hypothesized by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), 
occur through foregone tax revenues due to output losses. However, any conclusions about 
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the relation between fiscal costs and economic output losses are difficult due to a possible 
endogeneity. Additionally, near-by elections were found to decrease fiscal costs statistically 
significantly as near-by elections might serve as a disciplining device. They might ensure that 
politicians-in-power refrain from transferring public wealth to private wealth as these 
politicians hope to get re-elected. 
Finally, I investigated the U.S. banking and credit crisis that started in 2007, its development 
and origins, in a case study in Section 4. I identified securitization, the institutional 
environment, account imbalances, LBO‘s and hubris as major origins of this crisis. 
In conclusion, I recognize the advantages of external finance, financial systems and banks. 
However, these imperfect markets can also result in costly banking crises. As shown, 
especially developed nations seem to inhibit a larger probability of the occurrence of a 
banking crisis. Once a crisis is ongoing, larger government interventions were not found to 
decrease economic output loss. This suggests that policy makers must reconsider expensive 
government interventions in the future.  
Finally, the field of banking crises has evolved into two areas of research; open economy 
macroeconomics and microeconomics of banking and regulation. However, to understand 
financial crises better, future research must focus on how to better incorporate more bank and 
regulation level information into cross-country empirical research.  
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A1 
Appendices 
Appendix A1. Crisis classification accuracy of the determinants of banking crises 
This Appendix A1 presents how model 1.13, regressing determinants on a set of banking crises (Table 5), 
classified the studied 65 banking crises. Each actual banking crisis was either not predicted as a crises, 
predicted as a crisis exactly in the year of the actual crisis, predicted as a crisis one year prior the actual crisis 
or two or more years prior the actual crisis.  
Country Crisis 
Year 
Not predicted 
as a crisis 
Predicted as 
a crisis in the 
year of the 
crisis 
Predicted as 
a crisis 
starting 1 
year prior 
Predicted as a 
crisis starting 2 or 
more years prior 
Bangladesh 1987 X    
Benin 1988    X 
Bolivia 1986 X    
Brazil 1990  X   
Burkina Faso 1990 X    
Burundi 1994 X    
Cameroon 1987    X 
Cape Verde 1993    X 
Chad  1982 X    
Chile 1981   X  
China 1998 X    
Colombia 1982   X  
Congo, Republic of 1992    X 
Côte d'Ivoire 1998    X 
Dominican Republic 2003 X    
Ecuador 1982 X    
Egypt 1980 X    
El Salvador 1989    X 
Finland 1991 X    
Ghana 1982   X  
Guyana 1993 X    
Haiti 1994    X 
Hungary 1991    X 
India 1993 X    
Indonesia 1997    X 
Jamaica 1996 X    
Japan 1997    X 
Jordan 1989 X    
Kenya 1985 X    
Korea 1997    X 
Kuwait 1982 X    
Lebanon 1990    X 
Liberia 1991 X    
Madagascar 1988 X    
Malaysia 1997 X    
Mali 1987 X    
Mauritania 1987 X    
Mexico 1981 X    
Nepal 1988 X    
Niger 1983 X    
Nigeria 1991 X    
Norway 1991 X    
Panama 1988 X    
Paraguay 1995    X 
  
A1 
Appendix A1 continued. Crisis classification accuracy of hypothesis 1.13 about the 
determinants of banking crises. 
Country Crisis 
Year 
Not predicted 
as a crisis 
Predicted as 
a crisis in the 
year of the 
crisis 
Predicted as 
a crisis 
starting 1 
year prior 
Predicted as a 
crisis starting 2 or 
more years prior 
Peru 1983 X    
Philippine 1983 X    
Poland 1992 X    
Romania 1990 X    
Senegal 1988 X    
Sierra Leone 1990    X 
Sri Lanka 1989 X    
Swaziland 1995 X    
Sweden 1991 X    
Tanzania 1987 X    
Thailand 1983 X    
Togo 1993 X    
Tunisia 1991 X    
Turkey 1982   X  
Uganda 1994 X    
United States 1988 X    
Uruguay 1981 X    
Venezuela 1994    X 
Zambia 1995    X 
Zimbabwe 1995    X 
% in each category of 65 crises 65,62 1,56 6,25 26,25 
 
